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PAYING THE IRS WHISTLEBLOWER:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF COLLECTED PROCEEDS
Karie Davis-Nozemack*
Sarah Webber*
INTRODUCTION
Congressional changes to the IRS Whistleblower Program were
intended to induce more participation in the program by allowing larger
incentives and greater certainty that whistleblowers would be paid. Since
the Program was amended, tax whistleblower tips have increased 76
percent1 and revenue collected due to whistleblowers has increased 79
percent.2 Despite a rise in tips and revenue collected, whistleblower
payments have not increased. In fact, the number of tax whistleblower
awards paid has decreased 44 percent.3 We hypothesize that this trend is
due to the administration of the program but also to the interpretation of
“collected proceeds.” Collected proceeds are tax revenues collected due to
a specific whistleblower tip and comprise the pool of money from which a
tax whistleblower award is made. While scholarship exists examining the
Whistleblower Program amendments and their effects, no scholar has
critically examined the crux of the Whistleblower Program: what should
constitute collected proceeds.
This article offers critical analysis of both the Service’s interpretation of
“collected proceeds” as well as proposals advanced by whistleblower
advocates. Neither the IRS nor the whistleblower advocates’ interpretations
offer a properly inclusive view of collected proceeds.4 We suggest an
*
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1
See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
USE
OF
SECTION
7623,
at
16
(2010),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/annual_report_to_congress_fy_2010.pdf
(tips
increased from 4295 in 2006 to 7577 in 2010).
2
Id. (revenue collected increased from $258 million in 2006 to $464 million in 2010).
3
Id. (awards paid decreased from $24 million in 2006 to $28 million in 2010).
4
Generally, the IRS has emphasized an overly narrow interpretation of collected
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alternative view of collected proceeds that balances the need for an
attainable incentive,5 administrable program,6 and federal revenue
protection.7 Failing to achieve any one of these needs risks the
Whistleblower Program’s viability. We suggest a view of collected
proceeds that builds upon the Program’s successes and broadens its scope,
which should lead to increased federal revenue.
Part One of this paper discusses the statutory changes to the
Whistleblower Program, including the public policy behind the amendment
as well as the manner in which the new IRS Whistleblower Office has
administered the law.8 Part Two examines the Service’s interpretation of
the basis of whistleblower payments,9 the “proceeds of amounts collected
by reason of the information provided.”10 This Part uses the prior and
current IRS payment policy, statutory interpretation, the 2012 Final
Treasury Regulation, as well as conflicts between Service guidance and the
Internal Revenue Manual to conclude that the Service’s interpretation of
“collected proceeds” is not sufficiently inclusive.11 Part Three uses similar
critical analysis to view the whistleblower advocates’ proposed
proceeds, while whistleblower advocates have argued for an interpretation that is overly
inclusive and ignores the need for collection of funds prior to whistleblower compensation.
This paper analyzes these interpretations and the underlying interests to create a view of
collected proceeds that follows the statutory language but also addresses the interests of
whistleblowers and the IRS Whistleblower Program.
5
See Marsh J. Ferziger and Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics
and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1143,
1151-3, 1171-87 (1999) (discussing an enforcement-optimized bounty program under an
economic model and stating “The potential informant’s expected bounty payment may be
the single most important factor in ensuring optimal disclosures.”).
6
Id. at 1158-60 (“Whether a bounty scheme is profitable overall depends partly upon
the administrative costs of separating the meritorious from the nonmeritorious claims. The
IRS must sort through nearly ten thousand award claims every years, evaluating the merits
both of the offered information and the claim for reward.”). We also believe that the
complexity of the administrative structure also factors into the Program’s possible success.
7
See Kneave Riggall, Should Tax Informants be Paid? The Law and Economics of a
Government Monopsony, 28 VA. TAX REV. 237, 251 (2008) (“neoclassical economic
theory predicts that if the Service rewards tax informants, it would receive more tips, more
tax cheats would be “outed,” and tax revenues would increase.”). See also Ferziger &
Currell, supra note 5 at 1156 (“Payments out of proceeds, although introducing
uncertainty, remains the best procedure for most agencies. Without this option, it is
difficult to ensure a revenue-positive operation of the bounty programs.”).
8
See infra text accompanying notes 15-78.
9
See infra text accompanying notes 81-152.
10
§ 7623(a). The language of § 7623(b) differs slightly. See infra text accompanying
notes 99-106 (discussing of the difference and its ramifications).
11
See infra text accompanying notes 81-152.
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interpretation of “collected proceeds” and finds that it ignores the tax
realities of many alleged underpayments.12 Part Three concludes that the
whistleblower advocates’ proposals for collected proceeds are overly
inclusive.13 Finally, in Part Four, the paper considers a more balanced
approach to defining “collected proceeds.”14
I. HISTORY OF THE IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM
The IRS Whistleblower Program has successfully utilized a costeffective method to recover tax revenues and close the tax gap.15 While the
Program recovered $1.2 billion dollars between 2006 and 2010,16 the
Whistleblower Program needs further improvement to sustain and build
upon its success. This Part introduces the Whistleblower Program by
discussing the types of individuals involved in tax whistleblower claims,17
followed by the legislative history of the whistleblower statute18 and
administrative difficulties identified in the Whistleblower Program.19
Finally, this Part discusses improvements for the Program’s
administration,20 and concludes that, while administrative improvements are
needed, the most pressing need lies in clarifying “collected proceeds.”
A. Who is the Whistleblower?
The connotations associated with the whistleblower term vary
significantly. There are those who view the whistleblower as a “hero” or
champion protecting honest taxpayers and the tax system.21 Whistleblower
advocates point out that there is a huge cost to a whistleblower in coming
forward.22
A whistleblower providing information on tax fraud or
12

See infra text accompanying notes 153-277.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 153-277.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 278-314.
15
Tom Herman, Tipster Rewards Require Patience, WALL STREET J. Dec. 26, 2007, at
D3. See also Edward Morse, Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside
Information to Close the “Tax Gap,” 24 AKRON TAX J. 1, 11-13 (2009).
16
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 16 (stating proceeds
derived from whistleblower tips 2006-2010).
17
See infra text accompanying notes 21-33.
18
See infra text accompanying notes 34-55.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 56-80.
20
See infra text accompanying notes 76-78.
21
See Letter from Senator Charles Grassley, U.S. Senate, to Douglas Shulman,
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Serv., at 8, Sept. 13, 2011, available at
http://www.rewardtax.com/files/grassleylettertoshulman9_13_11.pdf.
22
See Internal Revenue Serv., Public Hearing on Proposed Regulation 26 C.F.R. Part
13
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improper return positions faces risks, such as “loss of job, loss of reputation,
loss of career.”23
Others take a different, and perhaps a much more negative view of
whistleblowers. A whistleblower often faces the particularly distasteful
distinction of being a “snitch.”24 In Senate debate of the 1998 Internal
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act, Senator Reid suggested
eliminating the IRS Whistleblower Program because a program that rewards
individuals who turn in co-workers, family members and other parties is
“just wrong”.25
Indeed, the Service itself previously treated tax
whistleblowers as “skunks at a picnic.”26 The Service has diligently worked
to change both its perspective and treatment of whistleblowers.
The whistleblower may be best viewed as a reluctant participant who
simply does not what to participate anymore. It could be that the
whistleblower has become fed up with the other participants or may be
persuaded to act based on an incentive from the IRS Whistleblower
Program. As eloquently stated in a comment letter, “promoters of tax
shelters and tax fraud are not surrounded by boy scouts and
angels.”27 Rather, “whistleblowers will often not have clean hands.”28
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Service often receives tips after a
relationship has gone bad, be it a familial, romantic, or business
relationship. It is this type of intimate relationship that often provides for
the “detailed inside knowledge that will be the most beneficial in bring
forward tax fraud.”29 The repercussions of whistleblowing can vastly
disrupt or change a whistleblower’s employment and relationships with coworkers, friends or even family members; however, oftentimes these
relationships were already in jeopardy of turning sour.
301, “Rewards and Awards for Information Relating to Violations of Internal Revenue
Laws,” at 13, May 11, 2011, available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc. 2011-10193 (comments
of Richard Rubin).
23
See Hearing Transcript, supra note 22 at 2 (comments of Linda Stengle).
24
144 CONG. REC. S4379-05, at S4397-98 (Statement of Sen. Reid).
25
Id.
26
See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1.
27
See Letter from Jesselyn Radack, Marsha Coleman-Adebayo, Gina Green to
Douglas Shulman, Internal Revenue Serv., Commissioner (Aug. 10, 2011) (expressing
concern I.R.M. factors for reducing a whistleblower award for whistleblowers who planned
and
initiated
an
action),
available
at
http://www.grassley.senate.gov/about/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=3693
6.
28
Id.
29
Id.
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Regardless of the positive or negative view of the whistleblower, it
cannot be disputed that the Whistleblower Program has been a successful
way for the Service to promote federal revenue protection.30 Arguably the
Program has been one the most successful, in terms of tax revenues
recovered versus cost of administering the program.31 The payment system
for rewarding whistleblowers is discussed in detail below including its
evolution32 and the most recent changes to payments.33
B. Early Incentives for Tax Whistleblowers
While the IRS Whistleblower Office is new, the idea of rewarding an
individual who turns in a party who intentionally misuses the Code or
misfiles taxes was authorized by statute in 1867. The original law provided
the Secretary with the authority to pay awards necessary for detecting and
punishing persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or scheming
to do so.34 The earliest versions of tax whistleblower awards did not
provide much incentive for whistleblowers and were underutilized by the
Service to attract informants.35 This could be attributed to the uncertainty
regarding payment amounts. Under the 1954 codification of § 7623, the
Secretary was given the discretion to determine award payments,36 and this
discretion was upheld in numerous court opinions regarding both the
decision whether to pay an award and the proper award amount.37
30

See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 16 (stating proceeds
derived from whistleblower tips 2006-2010).
31
Id. See also Morse, supra note 15, at 11-13.
32
See infra text accompanying notes 34-55, 81-152.
33
See infra text accompanying notes 153-314.
34
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 4 (citing Act of
Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473 (codified by Ch. 11, § 3463, 35 Rev. Stat. 686
(1873-74) (codified as § 7623 (1954)). See also Morse, supra note 15 at 11-13.
35
See Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Program
Thanks to the IRS Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447, 451 (Winter 2010)
(citing Dennis J. Ventry, Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX LAW. 357, 363-64
(Winter 2008) (concluding that the law that was in effect before December 2006 had
“paltry bounties, stingy administrators, inadequate protection for whistleblowers, and
unreceptive courts”)).
36
§ 7623.
37
See Kwon, supra note 35 at 453-455 (“While few whistleblowers filed suit to
challenge their award determinations, those who did had little success. . . . [T]he Service
won every one of the nineteen cases that whistleblowers filed to challenge awards from
1941 to 1998). See McGrath v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 978 (Ct. Cl. 1975) and Saracena
v. United States, 508 F.2d 1333, 1334-36 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (finding the Service had “complete
discretion in the first instance to determine whether an award should be made and, in the
second instance, to fix what, in [its] judgment, amounts to adequate compensation”). These
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Whistleblower payments were originally paid out of appropriated funds;
however, this payment system was revised in 1996 to use collected
proceeds for payments.38 This was a significant shift for the Whistleblower
Program that forced the Whistleblower Program to have additional
accountability for achieving its goal of revenue protection. The Program
would need to find the proper incentives that would attract whistleblowers
while still generating the maximum revenue increases. This fine-tuning of
proper incentives can be seen in the subsequent modifications to § 7623 and
continues in the changes to the corresponding Regulation.
The original § 7623 Regulation provided for the discretionary payment
of a minimum of one percent of the collected proceeds and a maximum of
fifteen percent of the collected proceeds, depending on the type of
information received. 39 The original Regulation also capped the maximum
payment to a whistleblower at $10 million dollars.40 Publication 733 lists
the payment schedule as:
Information Type
General Information with No
Direct Relationship to the
Determination
of
Tax
Liabilities
Information of value in the
determination
of
tax
liabilities
although
not
specific

Percentage of
Collected Proceeds
Awarded
1 Percent

10 Percent

Maximum Recovery
$10 Million

$10 Million

opinions were relied upon in subsequent decisions upholding the discretionary nature of the
IRS Whistleblower award. See Merrick v. United States, 846 F.2d 725, 726 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Carelli v. IRS, 668 F.2d 902, 904 (6th Cir. 1982); Destefano v. United States, 52
Fed. Cl. 291, 293 (2002) and Cambridge v. United States, 558 F.3d 1331, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
38
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, ß 1209(a), 110 Stat.1473 (1996)
(amending § 7623(a.)).
39
Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (as amended in 1998) (“The amount of a reward will
represent what the district or service center director deems to be adequate compensation in
the particular case, generally not to exceed fifteen percent of the amounts (other than
interest) collected by reason of the information.”).
40
Id. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBLICATION 733, REWARDS FOR
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY INDIVIDUALS TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Oct.
2004), available at http://www.unclefed.com/IRS-Forms/2005/p733.pdf and I.R.M.
25.2.2.5 (as amended Apr. 27, 1999).
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Information
causing
investigation or materially
assisted in the development
of an issue resulting in a
recovery

15 Percent

7

$10 Million

While the Regulation and Publication 733 offered some guidance for
payment percentages and maximum award recoveries, there was still much
uncertainty in determining a potential whistleblower’s award.
C. 2006 Code Changes and the Whistleblower Office Established
In response to Congress’s request for review of the Whistleblower
Program, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
(“TIGTA”) audited the Program in June 2006. The TIGTA audit showed
significant economic success for the IRS Informants’ Rewards Program,41
despite several shortcomings in the Program’s oversight and management.42
The Program generated significant revenue but could potentially generate
more.43 The TIGTA report also highlighted the problem with the current
percentage payout award structure (the 1, 10 and 15 percent structure)44 and
discretionary nature of payments. The TIGTA report signaled an
underutilized Program that was fraught with administrative problems as
well as a lack of a clearly defined incentive for potential whistleblowers.
The TIGTA report served as a springboard to push legislation forward that
could help strengthen the Whistleblower Program. Senator Charles
Grassley, the champion of the IRS Whistleblower Program and author of
the 2006 reforms, persuaded Congress to significantly overhaul the
41

The IRS Informants’ Rewards Program was renamed as the IRS Whistleblowers
Program following the 2006 § 7623 amendments.
42
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., The Informants' Reward Program
Needs More Centralized Management Oversight (June 2006), available at:
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2006reports/200630092fr.html. The TIGTA
report cites an internal Service study that it only cost the Treasury four cents for every
dollar collected under the Whistleblower Program in comparison to ten cents per dollar
collected for all other enforcement programs. See also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., The
Informants’ Project: A Study of the Present Law Reward Program (Sept.1999).
43
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 4 (noting that the
Whistleblower Program collected $258 million in fiscal year 2006).
44
See TIGTA Audit 2006, supra note 42 (“We were unable to determine the
justification for the reward percentage awarded to the informant in 32 percent of the cases.”
Regarding rejected claims, the statistics were more startling. “We were unable to
determine the rationale for the reviewer’s decision to reject the claim in 76 percent of the
cases reviewed.”).
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Whistleblower Program following the TIGTA report.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 200645 greatly enhanced the
Whistleblower Program46 and created an additional subsection to the
whistleblower Code provision, § 7623(b). Section 7623(b) applies in
situations where the “tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional
amounts in dispute exceed $ 2,000,000.”47 When the tax dispute involves
an individual taxpayer instead of a business, the individual’s annual gross
income must exceed $200,000.48 By adjusting the award to target high
dollar tax abuses, Congress intended to use the Whistleblower Program as a
way to get the maximum return in relation to the cost of the program.
“Congress hope[d] the lure of much bigger rewards w[ould] prompt more
informants to offer better tips and help the IRS reduce the nation's $290
billion tax gap, the difference between what the agency collects each year
and what it thinks it should be collecting.”49 Section 7623(b) also modified
the payment structure for whistleblowers. The maximum payment caps
were removed for § 7623(b) awards. Whistleblowers are now entitled to
“receive as an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the
collected proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and
additional amounts) resulting from the action (including any related actions)
or from any settlement in response to such action.”50 The new Code
provision also acknowledged that the whistleblower may not have clean
hands when blowing the whistle. An award is payable so long as the
whistleblower was not convicted of a crime for his or her involvement in
the tax underpayment.51
45

See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-432, § 406(a)(1)(D), 120
Stat. 2922 (2006), codified at § 7623(b) et seq.
46
The 2006 Act established the Whistleblower Office as a separate office within the
IRS. See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 5 (“Operating at the
direction of the Commissioner of the IRS, the Whistleblower Office coordinates with other
divisions of the IRS, analyzes information submitted, and makes award determinations.”).
Although permitted under statute, the Whistleblower Office does not currently investigate
whistleblower claims. Rather, the Whistleblower Office assigns investigation of a
whistleblower claim to the appropriate Service office to initial investigation.
47
See Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, supra note 45, codified at §
7623(b)(5)(B).
48
§ 7623(b)(5)(A).
49
See Herman, supra note 15. See also Morse, supra note 15 at 3-4 (noting that the
incentives provided under the 2006 changes to the whistleblower program “may indeed
enhance enforcement effectiveness, but collateral impacts on other social values, including
privacy and fidelity in professional relationships, also deserve consideration.”).
50
§ 7623(b)(1).
51
§ 7623(b)(3).
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The 2006 changes to the Whistleblower Program greatly increased the
value of awards available to the whistleblower, but also provided some
degree of certainty that was not present under the previous discretionary
payment system still codified in § 7623(a).52 Further, the 2006 changes to
the Program have led to more high quality submissions to the Service.53
Despite this positive response, there remains much uncertainty in the actual
payment process, especially as it relates to the terms “proceeds of amounts
collected” and “collected proceeds” used within § 7623. Although the 2006
amendments offered greater predictability for award payments,
whistleblowers still face uncertainty when calculating the total award
payment. It is unclear what are proceeds and when they are collected.
Assuming a whistleblower brought forth credible and helpful information
that would generally warrant a thirty percent award, the whistleblower’s
next obstacle was to determine the basis on which to calculate thirty
percent. Determining the total award payment has baffled whistleblowers
and their attorneys because collected proceeds has not been adequately
defined.54 In subsequent years, the Service has attempted to remedy this
problem by issuing additional guidance; however, numerous unanswered
questions remain.55
D. Administrative Challenges for the IRS Whistleblower Program
Following the 2006 amendments, the IRS received over forty new
claims within a two and one-half month period under the new § 7623(b)
provisions.56 IRS Whistleblower Office Director Stephen Whitlock stated
that although there were variations in the quality of the claims submitted,
the Service received “some very good claims with good support and very
52

§ 7623(a) permitted the payout of awards based on collected proceeds that are
deemed sums necessary.
53
Letter from Scott Knott and Gregory Lyman, Ferraro Law Firm, to Kristen Witter,
Internal Revenue Service at 4 (Apr. 18, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 20118482 (commenting on the value of awards).
54
This problem is compounded by the fact that the Whistleblower Office does not
remain in contact with the whistleblower once the whistleblower claim is submitted until
final payment. This has been a source of frustration for whistleblowers. The Service had
remained firm in limiting its contact with the whistleblower, but recently softened this
approach by issuing a regulation, effective March 15, 2011, allowing for confidential
disclosure to the whistleblower or the whistleblower’s legal representative regarding the
status of the whistleblower’s claim when the whistleblower has entered into a written
contract with the Service. See Treas. Reg. §301.6103(n)-2.
55
See infra text accompanying notes 81-277 for a discussion of open issues.
56
See Herman, supra note 15.
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promising leads.”57 The Service needs a great deal of time to build a
whistleblower case and examine the underlying tax return. In 2007,
Whistleblower Attorney Scott Knott suggested that the payment timeline for
whistleblower claims would likely run between four and seven years before
the whistleblower received any compensation.58 The lengthy payment
process remains a primary complaint of whistleblowers and their advocates.
This timing issue has been cited as a serious concern in the administration
of the Whistleblower Program.59 However, some have also recognized the
lengthy delay as a necessary component of the payout process:60 “The IRS
has been unfairly criticized for not paying any awards to date under [§]
7623 as amended in 2006 given the (i) time required to review the alleged
claim, examine the alleged tax violator, settle the proposed adjustments
through the appeals and/or judicial process and, finally, for the
Whistleblower Office to review the case file and process the award.”61
After the 2006 TIGTA audit of the IRS Whistleblower Program, TIGTA
conducted a follow-up audit in 2009. The 2009 TIGTA Audit showed that
there are still many aspects that could be improved in the Whistleblower
Program.62 At the time of the audit, the IRS Whistleblower Office was
implementing a single inventory control system and TIGTA recommended
performing physical reconciliations of claims to ensure all information was
captured in the new system.63 TIGTA also expressed concern over the
tracking of claims to ensure timely processing.64 The IRS responded
favorably to all of the recommendations and has implemented additional
quality checks based on TIGTA’s report, yet the timeliness of administering
the Program continues to be a concern.65
In its fiscal year 2010 report, the Whistleblower Office reported the
number of claims submitted, number of awards paid and the dollar amount
of the total awards paid. Based on the initial 2007 submissions, the Service
57

Id.
Id. (quoting Attorney Scott Knott).
59
See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1 (referring to a concern over the long
timeframes for processing claims).
60
Letter from Anonymous Taxpayer to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Serv., at 1
(Mar. 23, 2011) (commenting on Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-1).
61
Id.
62
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN FOR TAX ADMIN., 2009-30-114, DEFICIENCIES EXIST IN
THE CONTROL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF WHISTLEBLOWER CLAIMS, 3 (Aug. 20, 2009).
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 21.
58
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saw a significant increase in submission of § 7623(b) whistleblower claims
in 2008, 2009 and 2010; however, payments under § 7623(b) have yet to
occur.66 These submission levels suggest that the Service has been effective
in promoting the Whistleblower Program. They also indicate that the
revised incentive system under the 2006 statutory changes has been
successful in attracting whistleblowers to come forward.
§ 7623(B) SUBMISSIONS BY FISCAL YEAR67
Year

Number of Submissions

2007
2008
2009
2010

49
378
470
431

Number of Taxpayers
Identified
587
1366
2150
5429

AMOUNTS COLLECTED AND AWARDS PAID UNDER § 7623(A) FOR FISCAL
YEARS 2006-201068

Cases
Received
Awards
Paid
Collections
Over $2
million
Total
Amount of
Awards
Paid69
Amounts
Collected

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

4295

2751

3704

5678

7577

220

227

198

110

97

N/A

12

8

5

9

$24,184,458

$13,600,205

$22,370,756

$5,851,608

$18,746,327

$258,590,435

$181,784,287

$155,985,834

$206,032,872

$464,695,459

The data above does not present itself in perfect trends; however, a broad
66

Prior to the release of the Whistleblower Office’s Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report,
the press reported that one whistleblower payment under section § 7623(b) has been made.
See Jeremiah Coder, IRS Pays First Enhanced Whistleblower Award, TAX NOTES DOC
2011-7587 (Apr. 18, 2011).
67
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 9.
68
Id. at 16.
69
The IRS paid all of the awards listed above, including those paid in 2010, based on
the prior law, what is now § 7623(a). Therefore, the higher payout percentages from the
2006 § 7623(b) changes do not apply to the awards in this chart. Id. at 14.
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view shows a sharp decline in the number of awards paid in 2009 and 2010,
approximately half of the awards paid in the three previous years.70 In
2010, with significantly fewer awards, record proceeds were collected: $464
million.71 Greater submissions and revenue collected but fewer awards
could be a dangerous trend for the Whistleblower Program and should be
corrected in subsequent years.72 If potential whistleblowers believe there is
little chance of receiving payment in a reasonable time or are concerned that
an award may not come to fruition, the Service loses its ability to offer an
effective incentive to attract submissions.
The Whistleblower Office notes several points about the data above.
The first is that, “the number and amount of awards paid each year can vary
significantly, especially when a small number of high-dollar claims are
resolved in one year (as was the case in 2006 and 2008).”73 The other
important consideration to note is that during 2009 the Service changed the
point at which payment can be issued to the whistleblower, requiring a
longer waiting time for the two-year refund request window to close.74
Despite the failure to see any payments under § 7623(b) during the 2010
fiscal year, the Service’s data indicates an overall increase in interest in the
Whistleblower Program.75 Comparing 2006 to 2010, submissions have
risen under both § 7623(a) and § 7623(b). The data also indicates a concern
about the effectiveness of the current incentive program for whistleblowers
given the fact that claims are likely on the rise yet the number of payouts
have not seen a correlative increase. This award payment trend highlights
the concern about the current administrable nature of the Program and
whether the Service is effectively incentivizing whistleblowers.
The most recent governmental analysis of the Whistleblower Program
was a report released in September 2011 from the Government
Accountability Office (GAO). The GAO expressed concern over the
70

See supra text and charts accompanying notes 67-68.
See supra text and chart accompanying note 68.
72
The Service claims the trend is due solely to the time that it takes to resolve a
whistleblower claim and the underlying taxpayer’s examination. If this is the case, the only
concern that the trend suggest is perception of delay by whistleblowers. If, on the other
hand, the mismatch of high whistleblower tips and high revenue but few whistleblower
payments, then greater concern is warranted. It is unclear which is to blame.
73
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 14.
74
Id.
75
See supra text and charts accompanying notes 67-68 (showing increased § 7623(a)
and (b) submission when comparing 2006 and 2010 submissions).
71
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processing time for whistleblower claims.76 This concern echoes the data
released months prior in the 2010 Annual Report to Congress.77 The GAO
acknowledges that investigating a Whistleblower claim is an inherently long
process, but recommended process implementation to track the timing of a
submitted claim and monitor claims that lag behind time targets.78 While
the Service acknowledges delay problems, it remains to be seen whether the
GAO’s suggested changes will improve the system delays that have plagued
the Whistleblower Program.
Based on the TIGTA audit, Whistleblower Office Annual Report, and
GAO study, it appears that the Whistleblower Program has succeeded in
identifying tax fraud, return misfilings and other abuses of the Code, but
there are many areas in which the Program can be strengthened. Adding
certainty to the incentives offered to whistleblowers could greatly
strengthen the Whistleblower Program.79 It is clear from the governmental
studies conducted that the question of “when will payment occur?” has not
been answered effectively through the Whistleblower Program. This
administrative downfall should be reviewed and closely monitored to ensure
that improvements are being made. In Part II, the Service’s interpretation
of collected proceeds is examined including a review of the recent Treasury
Regulation, § 301.7623-1.80 The Regulation has shed some light on the
question of “how much” the whistleblower will be paid, but there are
several deficiencies in the Service guidance to define “collected proceeds.”
II. THE SERVICE’S INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTED PROCEEDS
In spite of the dramatic revisions to the Whistleblower Office, neither
the Code, Regulations, nor the Service’s internal guidance have provided a
precise definition of “collected proceeds.” The Service, however, has
delineated what it believes is and is not collected proceeds in several
forums, including the Regulations, Notices, Chief Counsel’s Program
Manager Technical Advice Memoranda (PMTA), and orally via Service
personnel at hearings.81 When read together the guidance fails to cover all
76

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-683, TAX WHISTLEBLOWERS:
INCOMPLETE DATA HINDERS IRS’S ABILITY TO MANAGE CLAIM PROCESSING TIME AND
ENHANCE EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION at 1 (Aug. 2011).
77
Whistleblower Office FY 2010 Report, supra note 1.
78
See GAO Report, supra note 76 at 1.
79
See Ferziger and Currell, supra note 5 at 1197-1200 (discussing the importance of
certainty in a bounty program).
80
See infra text accompanying notes 81-152.
81
See generally infra text accompanying notes 81-152.
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possible scenarios and is inconsistent. These shortcomings put the entire
Whistleblower Program at risk. The certainty of an incentive is a necessary
component to attract potential whistleblowers to come forward with
information.82 Current Service policies leave significant uncertainty
regarding how timing,83 refunds,84 credit balances,85 and tax attributes86
equate to collected proceeds. This uncertainty also risks adding to the
already lengthy administration process if a whistleblower appeals an award
decision based on the Service’s inconsistent guidance.
Part II identifies and addresses questions and inconsistencies that result
from the current Service interpretation of collected proceeds. This Part
begins by analyzing the significance of the 1996 amendments.87 The next
Subpart discusses the current statutory language.88 The third Subpart
reviews the evolution of the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM).89 The fourth
and fifth Subparts analyze current Office of Chief Counsel guidance and the
Regulation.90 The sixth and final Subpart highlights the inconsistencies and
gaps in coverage in the current Service guidance on collected proceeds.91
A. 1996 Amendments and Their Significance
Despite a long-standing statutory presence, the IRS Whistleblower
Program has only recently been significantly utilized.92 The increased use
occurred after substantial improvements within the past fifteen years.93
82

See Ferziger and Currell, supra note 5 at 1181-3 (discussing certainty and its effects
on government bounty programs).
83
See infra text accompanying notes 147-152, 270-277 (discussing timing issues).
84
See infra text accompanying notes 127-135, 147-152 (discussing inclusion of refund
denials in collected proceeds).
85
See infra text accompanying notes 127-152, 208-222 (discussing the partial
inclusion of credit balances in collected proceeds).
86
See infra text accompanying notes 175-207 (discussing exclusion of tax attributes in
collected proceeds).
87
See infra text accompanying notes 165-174 (discussing prior versions of § 7623).
88
See infra text accompanying notes 175-207 (discussing the current § 7623 and
collected proceeds).
89
See infra text accompanying notes 208-222 (discussing collected proceeds in the
context of the I.R.M.).
90
See infra text accompanying notes 127-146 (discussing Chief Counsel guidance and
Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1).
91
See infra text accompanying notes 147-152 (discussing inconsistencies).
92
See supra text accompanying notes 34-55 (discussing the history of the
Whistleblower Program).
93
See supra text accompanying notes 34-55 (discussing the 1996 and 2006
amendments to § 7623 and their effect on the Whistleblower Program).
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These improvements were intended to clarify and strengthen the Program
but that has not always been the result.94 Imprecise drafting, inconsistent
sources of authority, and undefined terms still plague determinations of
whistleblower awards.95 In 1996, Congress changed the pool of funds that
compensate a whistleblower from the Service budget to “proceeds of
amounts collected.”96 This change marks the beginning of the struggle to
delineate the sums that should comprise collected proceeds. The 1996
amendments also added the phrase “for detecting underpayments of tax” to
§ 7623.97 While a whistleblower award could still be made for broad
violations of the tax laws, these amendments (adding “for detecting
underpayments of tax” and payments made from “proceeds of collected
amounts”) focused the Whistleblower Program toward maximizing revenue,
not merely catching violators. The 1996 amendments led to a revision of
the associated Regulation, § 301.7623-1, to clarify that whistleblower
rewards were available where the information led to a denial of a refund,
not merely an affirmative recovery of taxes owed.98 The Regulation’s focus
on revenue protection, in terms of uncollected taxes as well as improper
refunds, was entirely consistent with the focus of the 1996 amendments.
This represented a significant change in the Service’s whistleblower policy
to reward information that produces additional federal revenues as a result
94

See infra text accompanying notes 136-147 (discussing the inconsistencies and
questions from recent Service guidance)
95
Id.
96
IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FISCAL YEAR 2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE USE
OF
SECTION
7623
at
1-2,
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/whistleblowerfy09rtc.pdf. See also § 7623, Pub. L. 104-168 (1996 amendments).
97
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., History of Whistleblower/Informant Program, available
at http://www.irs.gov/compliance/article/0,,id=181294,00.html. See also Taxpayer Bill of
Rights 2, Pub. Law 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996). Prior to the amendment, § 7623
stated, “The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is authorized to pay
such sums, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum appropriated therefore, as he may deem
necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the
internal revenue laws, or conniving at the same, in cases where such expenses are not
otherwise provided for by law.”
98
TREASURY DECISION 8770, REWARDS FOR INFORMATION RELATING TO
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS, ADOPTING FINAL REGULATION
(explanation of provision). See also Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (amended Aug. 21,
1998) (“The rewards provided for by section 7623 and this section will be paid from
the proceeds of amounts (other than interest) collected by reason of the information
provided. For purposes of section 7623 and this section, proceeds of amounts (other
than interest) collected by reason of the information provided include both additional
amounts collected because of the information provided and amounts collected prior to
receipt of the information if the information leads to the denial of a claim for refund
that otherwise would have been paid.
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of the whistleblower’s information.
B. Statutory Interpretation of Collected Proceeds
Following the Congressional changes in 2006 to the whistleblower
statutes, there are currently two systems under which a whistleblower may
be paid. The first is under § 7623(a), and the second is under the newer §
7623(b). Under subsection (a), the Service has discretion to pay a
whistleblower “from the proceeds of amounts collected by reason of the
information provided, and any amount so collected shall be available for
such payments.”99 Subsection (b)(1) provides for paying whistleblowers
“an award at least 15 percent but not more than 30 percent of the collected
proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional
amounts) resulting from the action . . . or from any settlement in response to
such action.”100
There are two distinctions here. First, the Service has the statutory
discretion with regard to award payment under § 7623(a),101 whereas
awards meeting the criteria of § 7623(b) are mandated.102 The Service has
no discretion in whether to make an award under § 7623(b), so long as the
statutory criteria are met. The second and far less critical difference is in
the language used: § 7623(a) and (b) use different language (proceeds of
amounts collected vs. collected proceeds) for the pool of money from which
to pay awards. The Service has stated that “[w]hile the language of section
7623 differs slightly between subsections (a) and (b), [the Service does] not
think the difference is meaningful and therefore the legal analysis . . .
should be the same for subsections (a) and (b).103 The Service’s
interpretation that the term “collected proceeds” applies under both
subsections (a) and (b) is consistent with legislative history104 and
subsequent Congressional statements.105
It appears the change in
99

§ 7623(a) (emphasis added).
§ 7623(b)(1) (emphasis added).
101
§ 7623(a) (“The Secretary . . . is authorized to p[ay such sums as he seems
necessary . . .).
102
§ 7623(b)(1) (“ . . . such individual shall receive as an award . . .”).
103
Program Manager Technical Assistance, PMTA 2010-62 (Sept. 1, 2010) (analyzing
the payment of refund protection and credit reduction claims under § 7623).
104
Little legislative history is available for the 2006 amendments. This is likely
because the Whistleblower amendments were only a small, an uncontroversial part of the
much larger Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, enacted on December 20, 2006.
105
See Press Release from Senator Check Grassley (Sept. 9, 2011) (identifying self as
the author of the 2006 amendments and urging the Service to working more closely with
100
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terminology is nothing more than word economy, resulting in the same
definitional analysis for both § 7623(a) and (b).106
C. Evolution of the Internal Revenue Manual
The Service’s whistleblower award policies have evolved over the last
fifteen years. The evolution is particularly evident when viewing the three
most recent versions of the Internal Revenue Manual (I.R.M.), which is a
compilation of the Service’s policies and procedures, including those
relevant to whistleblower claims.107 Because Service personnel use the
I.R.M. as a daily procedure guides, changes to the I.R.M. whistleblower
provisions can be viewed as manifestations of the Service’s changing
whistleblower policies.
The 1999 I.R.M., which was in force for the whistleblower provisions
through 2008, never defined collected proceeds. In fact, the 1999 I.R.M.
used other terms synonymously with collected proceeds.108 This, of course,
did not advance understanding of collected proceeds. Under the 1999
I.R.M., collected proceeds did not appear to be a term of art. Under the
1999 I.R.M., the Service included all criminal fines in collected proceeds.109
This policy was subsequently changed in the next version. The 1999 I.R.M.
further contemplated that the Service would net collected proceeds, within a
tax year and among tax years lengthening the payout process for
whistleblowers.110 The 1999 I.R.M. also required the closing of all tax
whistleblowers and their attorneys).
106
The authors have seen no variation in the synonymous interpretation of “proceeds
of amounts collected” and “collected proceeds” from either the Service or the
whistleblower advocates. All references throughout this paper to collected proceeds
presume to apply to both subsections (a) and (b).
107
MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2nd ed., at 3-126 (2002)
(discussing the Internal Revenue Manual).
108
I.R.M. 25.2.2.5(1)(a), (b), and (c), Allowance Computation (04-27-1999) (using the
term “amounts recovered”).
109
I.R.M. 25.2.2.13(a)(1), Partial Allowances (04-27-1999) (“A reward should not be
paid with respect to a particular tax year until the deficiency (tax, penalties, and fines) has
been paid in full for that specific tax year. However, a partial reward may be paid if, for
example, it can be ascertained in a criminal prosecution case that the conviction was
directly or indirectly attributable to the informant’s information. A reward allowance
based on the fine when paid may be made as a partial allowance prior to the civil
settlement of the tax liability.”) (emphasis added).
110
I.R.M. 25.2.2.12, Offsetting Adjustments (04-27-1999) (“(1) In determining
whether a reward should be allowed and, if so, the amount thereof, consideration should be
given to adjustments for one year which will result in potential tax savings to the taxpayer
for subsequent years or to another taxpayer for any year. (a) For example, if the closing
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years before payment could be made, with limited exceptions in areas like a
criminal prosecution and when a tax year’s deficiency had been paid in
full.111 These policies required an overly broad interpretation of finality
raising a concern that a whistleblower may not receive payments for an
extended period of time.
The Service has twice amended the Internal Revenue Manual’s
whistleblower section following the 2006 statutory changes to § 7623.112
The first I.R.M. amendment was published in December 2008,113 and the
second I.R.M. amendment was published in June 2010.114 The 2008 I.R.M.
amendment overhauled nearly almost every provision in the I.R.M.
whistleblower section. It created new procedures for the two systems of
cases and processes for administering claims.115 In addition, the I.R.M.
addressed the need to delay payment until appeals in the underlying case
had resolved,116 which was not necessarily contemplated in the prior I.R.M.
version.117 Despite these helpful clarifications, problems with the 2008
inventory for one year is increased, resulting in an increase in income for that year, the
opening inventory for the next succeeding year will be correspondingly increased, resulting
in a decrease in income for that year. The deficiency for the first year is offset by the
corresponding decrease in income for the subsequent year, usually resulting in no net tax
recovery. . . . (c) Information may be furnished and claim for reward filed with respect to
the returns of one taxpayer for several years. If one of the years is closed with assessment
and payment of a deficiency, but the other years are still under examination, no reward
should be granted for the closed year until examination of all years has been completed.
This is true since adjustments made to the returns for the open years may result in
offsetting adjustments, no reward should be allowed until the overall results of the
information furnished may be evaluated.”).
111
I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(c), Offsetting Adjustments (04-27-1999). See also I.R.M.
25.2.2.13(1), Partial Allowances (04-27-1999) (“(1) Partial allowance of a reward claim
should be made where feasible. (a) A reward should not be paid with respect to a particular
tax year until the deficiency (tax, penalties, and fines) has been paid in full for that specific
tax year. However, a partial reward may be paid if, for example, it can be ascertained in a
criminal prosecution case that the conviction was directly or indirectly attributable to the
informant’s information. A reward allowance based on the fine when paid may be made as
a partial allowance prior to the civil settlement of the tax liability.”).
112
I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq.
113
I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq. (12-30-2008).
114
I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq. (06-18-2010).
115
I.R.M. 25.2.2 et seq. (12-30-2008).
116
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(5), Overview: Authority & Policy (12-30-2008) (stating “the
requirement that claims be paid from collected proceeds generally means that payment
cannot be made for several years after the information is submitted, because the underlying
taxpayer’s case (including any appeals) must be resolved.”).
117
I.R.M. 25.2.2.9, Repayment of reward in Certain Cases (04-27-1999)
(contemplating circumstances and procedures for whistleblowers repaying awards if the
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version of the I.R.M. whistleblower section remained. It was unclear on
what basis the thresholds in (b) would be measured. Would they be
measured on the allegations in the tip or on the proceeds collected? What if
the Service settled the matter or allowed an offer in compromise for less
than the determined deficiency? It was also unclear as to when an
underlying tax case was “resolved” and collected proceeds could be
ascertained.
In the most recent I.R.M. whistleblower provisions, adopted in 2010
only eighteen months after the prior version, the Service clarified a number
of provisions but failed to resolve issues with others. For example, the 2010
I.R.M. added significant clarity regarding the requirement of finality before
payment,118 specificity in processing 7632(a) and (b) claims,119 defining a
related action for tips that lead to mushrooming of taxpayers, tax years, or
issues,120 the whistleblower administrative proceeding,121 and factors in
award computation.122
Unfortunately, the 2010 I.R.M. still has not offered clarity for
determining how to calculate whether a tip will be paid under §7623(a) or
(b). The I.R.M. now states that the Service will use “the best information
available” to determine the amount in dispute in determining “ground for
not processing claims for award.”123 The 2010 I.R.M. also fails to address
how a compromise of a deficiency by the Service will affect the calculation
of collected proceeds. More importantly, despite including statements
regarding finality and calculation of collected proceeds,124 the Service’s
only clear guidance was that it will wait until the two-year refund period

collected proceeds were reduced.).
118
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010).
119
I.R.M. 25.2.2.6, Processing of the Form 211 7623(a) Claim for Award (06-182010) and 25.2.2.7, Processing of the Form 211 7623(b) Claim for Award (06-18-2010).
120
I.R.M. 25.2.2.2(8), General (06-18-2010).
121
I.R.M. 25.2.2.8, Whistleblower Award Administrative Proceeding (06-18-2010).
122
I.R.M. 25.2.2.9, Award Computation (06-18-2010).
123
I.R.M. 25.2.2.5, Grounds for Not Processing Claims for Award (06-18-2010).
124
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (stating “The
requirement that claims be paid from collected proceeds generally means that payment will
not be made until there is a final determination of tax liability (including taxes, penalties,
interest, additions to tax and additional amounts) owed to the Service and such amounts
have been collected by the Service. A final determination of tax does not occur until the
statutory period for filing a claim for refund expires or there is an agreement between the
taxpayer and the Service that there has been a final determination of tax for a specific
period and a waiver of the right to file a claim for refund is effective.”).
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under § 6511 has passed before it will issue payment.125 While definitive
with respect to that narrow circumstance, it leaves open questions of when
finality is achieved with respect to court proceedings, settlements, and
closing agreements. The I.R.M. is utterly silent as to when “measurement”
of collected proceeds will occur. Some of these open questions from the
I.R.M. were addressed in the current Service guidance;126 however, these
attempts for clarification have also led to inconsistent guidance.
D. Office of Chief Counsel Memoranda
Despite two I.R.M. revisions in less than two years,127 Service guidance
is needed to further delineate collected proceeds. The Service recognizes
this and has issued a few pieces of guidance.128 Unfortunately, even with
the additional guidance, holes remain. Worse, the guidance contradicts the
most recent I.R.M.
The most recent guidance has come in the form of Office of Chief
Counsel Memoranda and the Final Regulation issued in February 2012. In
a 2010 internal memorandum, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel analyzed
whether criminal fines should be used as part of collected proceeds.129 The
Office concluded, “that criminal fines, which must be deposited into the
Crime Victims Fund (CVF), cannot be used for the payment of
whistleblower awards.”130 This response is consistent with the revisions to
the 2010 I.R.M. regarding criminal fines and their exclusion from collected
125

I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(6), Funding Awards (06-18-2010) (stating “until there is a final
determination of tax liability (including taxes, penalties, interest, additions to tax and
additional amounts) owed to the Service and such amounts have been collected by the
Service. A final determination does not occur until the statutory period for filing a claim
for refund expires or there is an agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS that there has
been a final determination of tax for a specific period and a waiver of the right to file a
claim for refund is effective.”). See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(7), Funding Awards (06-182010) (stating “The award payment cannot be completed until the statutory period for filing
a claim for refund expires or there is an agreement between the taxpayer and the IRS that
there has been a final determination of tax for the specific period and the right to file a
claim for a refund has been waived.”). See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority
and Policy (06-18-2010), supra note 124.
126
See supra text accompanying notes 127-135.
127
The Service amended I.R.M. 25.2.2 in December 2008 and again in June 2010.
128
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 22, 2012); Program Manager
Technical Assistance, PTMA 2010-60, Criminal Fines and Whistleblower Awards, (Feb.
22, 2010); Program Manager Technical Assistance, PTMA 2010-62, Payment of Refund
Protection and Credit Reduction Claims, (Sept. 1, 2010).
129
See PTMA 2010-60, supra note 128 at 1.
130
Id.
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proceeds.131
Later in 2010, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel again clarified collected
proceeds in a subsequent memorandum. PTMA 2010-62 attempted to
clarify the inclusion of “Payment of Refund Protection and Credit
Reduction Claims” in collected proceeds.132 The memorandum considers
refund denials and some credit reduction claims as part of “collected
proceeds” when determining whistleblower awards.133 The controversial
part stated that “collected proceeds . . . include denied refunds and the
reduction of an overpayment of a credit balance when the information
provided by the whistleblower prevents the IRS from paying the refund or
applying a credit balance to offset other tax liabilities.”134
Both memoranda offered guidance on specific types of collected
proceeds but still failed to offer a clear and concise definition. This
guidance is important because it signifies the Service’s commitment to
clarifying the term “collected proceeds” as it relates to §7623. However,
despite the well-meaning attempts to narrow the definition of collected
proceeds, this guidance has been difficult to reconcile with the I.R.M.
Indeed, the 2010 I.R.M. specifically states that refund claims and credit
balances are not included in collected proceeds calculations.135
Acknowledging the need for further clarification, the IRS issued Final
Regulation § 301.7623-1 in February 2012 to clarify the ambiguous
“proceeds” terminology.

131

See e.g. I.R.M. 25.2.2.12, Funding Awards (06-18-2010) (The 2010 I.R.M. states
that “[c]riminal fines, which must be deposited into the Victims of Crime Fund, cannot be
used for payment of whistleblower awards.”). Compare I.R.M. 25.2.2.13, Partial
Allowances (04-27-1999) (The 1999 I.R.M. stated that “[a] reward should not be paid with
respect to a particular tax year until the deficiency (tax, penalties, and fines) has been paid
in full for that specific tax year. However, a partial reward may be paid if, for example, it
can be ascertained in a criminal prosecution case that the conviction was directly or
indirectly attributable to the informant’s information. A reward allowance based on the fine
when paid may be made as a partial allowance prior to the civil settlement of the tax
liability.”). See also infra text accompanying notes 227-231 (discussing criminal fines).
132
See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
135
I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(1), Funding Awards (06-18-2010) (states “credit balance”
reduction is not within scope of collected proceeds. See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(7), Overview:
Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (disallowing “information which leads to denial of a
clam for refund which otherwise would have been paid.”).

22

Paying the IRS Whistleblower

1-Mar-12

E. Treasury Regulation § 301.7623-1
Enhancing the certainty of an award for potential whistleblowers is a
primary objective of an effective incentive program.136 As discussed in the
Program administration concerns above, the timing of the award payment is
key to creating a successful incentive-based Program.137 The question of
when will payment occur and how much will be paid are inextricably tied.
While the 2006 amendments attempted to add greater certainty to the
payment percentages, the question of what is the proper basis to calculate
the reward upon has yet to be properly defined. The IRS acknowledged this
concern and issued a Proposed Regulation in January 2011, which it made
final in February 2012. The key terms to define in the 2006 changes to
§7623 are “proceeds of amounts collected” and “collected proceeds.”
The Internal Revenue Manual had generally regarded collected proceeds
as “new monies collected,”138 but § 301.7623-1(a)(2) builds upon the 2010
Chief Counsel guidance regarding refunds denials and overpayment credit
balances.139 The Regulation attempts to resolve outstanding questions
regarding the definition of “proceeds of amounts collected” and “collected
proceeds” for purposes of § 7623.140 The refund prevention claims apply to
whistleblower claims under either § 7623(a) and (b). The Regulation also
provides that the reduction of an overpayment credit balance may also be
used to determine proceeds of amounts collected and collected proceeds
under § 7623.141
The Regulation includes as “both proceeds of amounts collected and
collected proceeds . . . tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and
136

See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 5 at 1172 (“Expressed economically, an agency
should increase bounty incentives until the administrative costs incurred by the marginal
inflow of the tips exceed the value of the agency marginal incentive in regulatory
effectiveness. Thus, agencies should maximize a potential informants discounted rewards
ad minimize his discounted losses without making the mix so attractive as to induce the
disclosure of large amounts of bad information.” (internal citations omitted)).
137
See supra text and charts accompanying notes 68-73.
138
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1, Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010).
139
See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128.
140
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a)(2) (as amended Feb, 22, 2012) (The Regulation
defines collected proceeds to “include: tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and
additional amounts collected by reason of the information provided; amounts collected
prior to receipt of the information if the information provided results in the denial of a
claim for refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction of an overpayment
credit balance used to satisfy a tax liability incurred because of the information provided.”).
141
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a) (as amended Feb. 22, 2012).
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additional amounts collected by reason of the information provided.”142
The Regulation does not include “fines,” likely to support the Service’s
position that 42 U.S.C. § 10610 does not allow the Service access to
proceeds for distribution.143 It also inserts interest as another item to
consider as collected proceeds. This Regulation allows for a “catch all” for
other sums to include in the award determination.
Following the release of the 2011 Proposed Regulation, the IRS
Whistleblower Office expressed limitations that are inherent to the
definition of “collected proceeds” in its 2010 Annual Report to Congress.
“The definition of “collected proceeds” does not extend to all recoveries
from taxpayers.”144 The report cites two key areas that do not result in
collected proceeds: (1) a taxpayer with a net operating loss carryforward
from a prior year or carried back from a future tax year and (2) a taxpayer
subject to certain criminal fines.145 Under either of the two alternatives, the
whistleblower’s information may prove accurate; however, the potential
collection from the taxpayer is resolved in a way that does not generate
proceeds as defined in § 7623 or its Regulations.146 The acknowledgment
from the Whistleblower Office of the limitations of the term collected
proceeds for criminal fines and net operating losses is a good indication that
the Service is attempting consistency throughout its internal guidance and
I.R.M., but there are still concerns that not all Service explanations of
collected proceeds achieve this same level of consistency.
The Service again acknowledged these issues in the preamble to Final
Regulation § 301.7623-1. While the Service adopted the same language in
the Final Regulation as was proposed in Proposed Regulation, the Service
used the Final Regulation’s preamble to make clear that Whistleblower tips
that involve net operating losses and criminal fines may not result in
collected proceeds from which to pay a Whistleblower.
F. Inconsistencies and Unresolved Areas of Collected Proceeds
As stated above, the I.R.M. now states that the Service will use “the best
information available” to determine the amount in dispute in determining
142

Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 223-238 (discussing criminal fines).
144
See WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FY 2010 REPORT, supra note 1 at 12 (describing
“Other Issues of Interest”).
145
Id.
146
Id.
143
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“ground for not processing claims for award.”147 This language is
inherently vague and ambiguous. The goal of providing certainty of an
incentive fails terribly under such a definition to determine when a tip does
not warrant an award. Adding to the lack of certainty in the award payment
is the failure to address the award calculation when the IRS calculates a
total tax deficiency due from the tax wrongdoer and the deficiency
calculation is greatly reduced by an offer of compromise. Not only is the
award payout amount unclear, but so is the timing of when the payment will
occur. This lack of finality,148 as it applies to court proceedings,
settlements, and closing agreements, creates significant uncertainty risk to
the whistleblower.
If a whistleblower is unsure when he or she will
receive an award or how that award will be calculated, then that
whistleblower is much less likely to come forward.149
Worse than the lack of guidance are the inconsistencies written into the
I.R.M. The Service issued contrary guidance to two I.R.M. provisions mere
months after it released the 2010 I.R.M. revision. I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(1) states
“credit balance” reduction is not within scope of collected proceeds, and
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(7) disallows “information which leads to denial of a clam
for refund which otherwise would have been paid.” Less than 3 months
later, the Office of Chief Counsel wrote PTMA 2010-62, which specifically
allows award based on “overpayment credit balances” and refund protection
claims.
The latter interpretation was validated by the Proposed
Regulation150 released six months later on January 18, 2011, signifying that
the Service had come to a clear conclusion. The Proposed Regulation was
subject to an open comment period. Not surprisingly, many whistleblower
advocates were quick to point out the inconsistency in drafting as well as
shortfalls of the definition of “collected proceeds” proposed.151 The
147

I.R.M. 25.2.2.5, Grounds for Not Processing Claims for Award (06-18-2010).
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (stating “The
requirement that claims be paid from collected proceeds generally means that payment will
not be made until there is a final determination of tax liability (including taxes, penalties,
interest, additions to tax and additional amounts) owed to the Service and such amounts
have been collected by the Service. A final determination of tax does not occur until the
statutory period for filing a claim for refund expires or there is an agreement between the
taxpayer and the Service that there has been a final determination of tax for a specific
period and a waiver of the right to file a claim for refund is effective.”).
149
See Ferziger and Currell, supra note 5 at 1181 (“an informant’s perception of his
likelihood of actually recovering a bounty seriously impacts his willingness to provide
information by discounting, sometimes heavily, the potential value of the bounty or other
reward.”).
150
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1.
151
See Letter from Scott Knott and Gregory Lyman, Ferraro Law Firm., to Kristen
148
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whistleblower advocates offered suggestions for improving the language of
the Proposed Treasury Regulation. None of these suggestions were
incorporated into the Final Regulation’s language; however, some of the
concerns were noted in the preamble. The whistleblower advocates’
suggestions are analyzed in Part III below.152
III. WHISTLEBLOWER ADVOCATES’ INTERPRETATION OF COLLECTED
PROCEEDS
On January 18, 2011, the IRS published Proposed Regulation §
301.7623-1, to clarify “the definition of proceeds of amounts collected and
collected proceeds under section 7623”153 and requested comments. In
response, seventeen written comments were received from whistleblower
advocates,154 a student and an anonymous taxpayer.155 A few months later,
on May 11, 2011, five whistleblower attorneys testified at a hearing on the
Proposed Regulation.156 In their hearing testimony and written comments,
whistleblower attorneys generally argued for a more expansive reading of
collected proceeds. While a more expansive reading is certainly in the
whistleblower attorneys’ interest as well as their clients’, an expansive
reading may result in a loss of federal revenue protection. Whistleblower
advocate comments have offered evidence that the current Service approach
is overly narrow, provides conflicting guidance, and fails to account for the
variety of forms and scenarios in whistleblower cases. The Service
acknowledges it has provided insufficient guidance both explicitly in a
Whistleblower Office report and implicitly in the preamble to the Final
Regulation.157 It is not clear, however, if the Service understands the
Witter, Internal Revenue Service (Aug. 18, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc
2011-17953 (discussing the conflicts between I.R.M. 25.2.2.12 and PTMA 2010-62). See
also infra text accompanying notes 153-270 (discussing alternative proposals regarding
collected proceeds).
152
See infra text accompanying notes 153-277.
153
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1, 76 Fed. Reg. 2852 (Jan. 18, 2011).
154
See Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (Feb. 21, 2012). See also Collected
Comments on Proposed Regulations: Payment of Whistleblower Rewards, 2011 TAX
NOTES TODAY 90-33 (May 9, 2011). (comments were submitted by individual
whistleblower attorneys, their law firms, and a group representing the interests of
whistleblower attorneys, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund).
155
See Collected Comments, supra note 154.
156
See generally Hearing Transcript, supra note 22.
157
See IRS WHISTLEBLOWER OFFICE FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 1 at 7. See also Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 21, 2012)
(noting that the Regulation does not address all of the concerns voiced in by commenters,
including the ability of the Service to compensate a Whistleblower for a tip that prevents
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severity of the insufficiency, or if the Service fully appreciates the need for
drafting specific language to account for the wide variety of potential issues
in whistleblower cases.
Whistleblower advocates’ proposals regarding collected proceeds can
generally be grouped into five proposal types warranting attention.158 The
following Part will evaluate the whistleblower advocates’ proposals for (1)
an expanded definition of collected proceeds,159 the inclusion of (2) tax
attributes,160 (3) overpayments credit balances,161 and (4) criminal fines162
in the definition as well as the (5) finality163 and (6) timing issues.164
A. What are Collected Proceeds?
Some whistleblower advocates have suggested broad standards for
interpreting collected proceeds. One position that has been advocated is
utilizing the standard “for the benefit of the Treasury” when considering
what should be a collected proceed.165 Other whistleblower advocates
suggested equating collected proceeds to “net positive effect” for the U.S.
future tax avoidance).
158
See infra text accompanying notes 165-269. It should be noted that in the hearing
and comment letters whistleblower attorneys made other suggestions, however, we have
confined our comments to the most frequently mentioned and/or meritorious.
159
See infra text accompanying notes 165-174 (discussing the potential for an
expanded definition of collected proceeds).
160
See infra text accompanying notes 175-207 (discussing exclusion of tax attributes
from collected proceeds).
161
See infra text accompanying notes 208-222 (discussing the partial inclusion of
credit balances in collected proceeds).
162
See infra text accompanying notes 223-238 (discussing the partial exclusion of
criminal fines from collected proceeds).
163
See infra text accompanying notes 239-269 (discussing issues of tax liability
finality for the purposes of collected proceeds).
164
See infra text accompanying notes 270-277 (discussing the timing of measuring
collected proceeds and the timing of paying awards based on collected proceeds).
165
See Letter from Michael Sullivan and Richard Rubin, Finch McCranie LLP, to
Kristen Witter and Richard Hurst, Internal Revenue Serv., at 4-5 (Apr. 18, 2011), available
at 2011 TAX NOTES TODAY 77-20, (stating that “[f]undamental to an IRS whistleblower
program is the concept of benefit to the Treasury. As the fundamental underlying the
program, logically "benefit to the Treasury" should serve as the basis for determining and
quantifying whistleblower rewards, and therefore as the basis for determining Collected
Proceeds. Furthermore, we understand that the yardstick of benefit to the Treasury was
applied in determining payments under the pre- 2006 IRS whistleblower program.”). See
also Hearing Transcript, supra note 22 at 14 (remarks of Richard Rubin stating, “Very
much echoing the comments of my colleagues, I would suggest that collective proceeds,
the fundamental there, is net benefit to the Treasury. It's as simple as that.”).
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Treasury.166
Unfortunately, neither proposal is feasible for a successful
administration of the Whistleblower Program. The phrases “for the benefit
of the Treasury” and “net positive effect” to the Treasury are even more
amorphous and ambiguous than the current collected proceeds standard.
Without adopting significant guidance defining “for the benefit of the
Treasury” or “net positive effect,” neither of these terms are practical
solutions. The proposed terms are not workable because neither term offers
a certain calculation and would merely create confusion in award
determinations. The Treasury has the benefit of funds deposited within it,
and similarly funds deposited with the Treasury have a net positive effect.
The Treasury derives no current benefit from funds not deposited.
Uncollected tax liabilities are speculative future benefits for the Treasury.
Paying a whistleblower award from not yet (if ever) collected funds does
not create any certain positive or beneficial effect to the Treasury.
There is a potential positive effect to the Treasury if proceeds are in fact
collected at a later date. However, such payments also risk a potential
negative effect on the Treasury if no future proceeds are collected but funds
have already been paid as an award to a whistleblower. Proposals for
adoption of either phrase as equivalent to or instead of collected proceeds
are thinly veiled attempts to read “collected” out of collected proceeds in
order to expand the basis for paying whistleblowers. These proposals are
attempts to have the Service pay whistleblowers without necessarily having
the proceeds in hand. Further, these proposals leave open the very real
possibility of paying whistleblowers from uncollected, and possibility never
collected, funds. This payment system entirely conflicts with a primary
objective of the Whistleblower Program: federal revenue protection.
Using a standard that attempts to read “collected” out of the statute is
contrary to the legislative intent of the whistleblower statutes. The word
166

See Hearing Transcript, supra note 22, at 14 (remarks of Thomas Pliske, stating “I
think net positive effect are three good words that should be used to define collected
proceeds. If the government comes out ahead whether it's a reducement of the assessment
because it's a tax calculation or it's the payment of the liability from a credit, either way the
government is positively affected and the definition should be expanded to include not
operating loss.”). See also id. (remarks of Linda Stengle, stating “The key issue here is:
Was there a positive net effect on the Treasury? Positive net effect on the Treasury should
be the basis for calculating the award to the whistleblower. When you broaden the
definition and you focus on positive net effect to the Treasury, then its going to be a lot
easier for the Whistleblower’s Office to make their calculations.”).
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“collected” was intentionally included in the statute to modify proceeds.167
Senator Grassley authored the 2006 IRS whistleblower amendments as well
as the 1986 False Claims Act qui tam whistleblower provisions.168 The
False Claims Act served as a model for the 2006 IRS whistleblower
amendments.169 A qui tam plaintiff170 recovery under the 1986 False Claims
legislation is paid as a percentage of the “proceeds” of the action or
settlement of the claim.171 Twenty years later, Senator Grassley, drafted
that tax whistleblower recoveries were to be made from “collected
proceeds.”172 He has expressly stated he based the IRS whistleblower
provisions on the qui tam provisions.173 When examining legislation by the
same author for similar purposes (e.g., to reward efforts that assist in
recovering amounts owed to the federal government), it follows that the use
of different terminology must have meaning, particularly the addition of a
modifying term. Despite definitional proposals to the contrary,174 the term
“collected” cannot simply be read out of the statute and its usage has a clear
purpose in the statutory language.
B. Tax Attributes
While the terminology proposals in Subpart IV.A. above have gained
some support of whistleblower advocates,175 the proposals ignore the need
to define “proceed” and what it means for a “proceed” to be collected. This
failure reappears in examining another, more common proposal of
whistleblower attorneys: to treat tax attributes176 as collected proceeds.
167

This modifying term is a result of the 1986 False Claims Act language requiring
“recovery”. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq.
168
See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1.
169
Id.
170
For the purposes of this article, both a qui tam plaintiff under the False Claims Act
and a whistleblower/informant under the IRS provisions will be referred to as
whistleblowers.
171
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
172
§ 7623(b)(1). Please note that a version of § 7623(a) was adopted in 1998 and uses
the term “proceeds of amounts collected.” See supra text accompanying notes 99-106
(explaining that the Service treats “proceeds of collected amounts” and “collected
proceeds” as having the same meaning).
173
See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 1.
174
See supra text accompanying notes 165-174 (discussing proposed changes to the
term “collected proceeds”).
175
See supra text accompanying notes 165-174.
176
Tax attribute is defined § 108(b)(2) to include the following: net operating losses,
general business credits, minimum tax credits, capital loss carryovers, basis of property,
passive activity loss and credit carryovers and foreign tax credit carryovers.
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A proceed is “that which results, proceeds, or accrues from some
possession or transaction.”177 With respect to a tax whistleblower case,
proceeds are that which results from the passing of information to the
Service. Admittedly, by definition, proceeds do not necessarily have to be
money.178 This is certainly so in the tax context. Fundamental tax concepts,
such as gross income179 and amount realized,180 contemplate far more than
cash in hand.181 Proceeds as more than money received have also been
allowed in some qui tam cases.182
While the definition of proceed expands beyond cash on hand, allowing
the reduction of tax attributes such as net operating losses (NOLs), capital
loss carryovers, foreign tax credits, and other tax credits, to be quantified as
proceeds fails to comply with the fundamental structure of the U.S. income
tax system. Calculation of U.S. income tax for both individuals and
businesses requires the addition, subtraction, and limitation of multiple tax
items.183 While the starting point of calculation is gross income,184 and the
177

BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 6th ed. at 1204-5 (defining proceeds).
Id. (defining proceeds and noting “[p]roceeds does not necessarily mean only cash
or money.”).
179
§ 61(a) (Gross incomes “means all income from whatever sources derived.”).
180
§ 1001(b) (Amount realized is the “sum of any money received plus the fair market
value of the property (other than money) received.”).
181
See generally Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (“Here
we have undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion.”), Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 Cum. Bull. 60 (concluding that the
“fair market value of property or services taken into payment must be included into
income.”).
182
See Letter from Susan Strawn, Cleveland Lawrence III, Erika Kelton, and Paul D.
Scott, Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue
Service at 5 note 7 (Apr. 18, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY, Doc 2011-8440 (“For
example, United States, ex rel. Thornton v. Science Applications Int'l Corp., 207 F.3d 769
(5th Cir. 2000), held that the value of settled claims in a non-cash recovery should be
included as part of a relator's share award. Thornton further concluded that the government
has a duty to advise the relator of the value of the settlement, including the non-cash
proceeds. United States, ex rel. Barajas v. United States, 258 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001),
likewise ruled that settlement proceeds need not always consist of money or some tangible
asset, and that a whistleblower was entitled to a share of the value of a non-cash settlement.
In Barajas, the court concluded that the whistleblower should share in the value of repairs
to faulty data transmitters -- non-cash services valued at as much as $10 million dollars.
See also United States ex rel. Nudelman v. International Rehabilitation Associates, 2005
US Dist. LEXIS 9605 (E.D. Penn. 2005), concluding that the relator should share in the
value of three year monitoring agreement (valued at $1.5 million).”).
183
See BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, AND LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 2-2 (3d 2002) (explaining and listing the calculation
of federal income tax liability)
178
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ending point is tax liability,185 the calculation requires other items,
specifically tax attributes like the ones mentioned above to be accounted
for. The Service requires reporting of much information other than tax
liability,186 but the Service collects only two things from taxpayers:
information and money. Anything other than money is information. While
a tax attribute may serve to reduce tax liability, it is not collected and cannot
be under the current U.S. tax structure.
That is not to say that tax attributes never have value. Tax attributes
may have value under certain circumstances. The effort to consider tax
attributes as proceeds recognizes their very real value, in many but not all
cases, to taxpayers. In many merger and acquisition deals, NOLs and other
tax attributes are given value.187 They are certainly considered in
negotiating the structure of a deal and factor into price.188 Accounting rules
for taxes, ASC 740, requires businesses to characterize NOLs as assets.189
Indeed, an NOL is listed on a balance sheet as a deferred tax asset.190

184

Id. (listing gross income as the starting point).
Id. at 2-7 (“The statutory concept of taxable income is the end product . . .
determining what shall be included, excluded, or deducted in computing tax liability . . ..”).
186
See generally Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax
Gap: When is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733 (2010)
(discussing the policy and effect of information reporting and citing numerous examples).
187
Thomas W. Bottomlee, Jason S. Bazar and Arthur C. Walker, Don’t Ignore a
Target’s NOLs: The Price and Structure of Your Deal Can Depend on Them, 9 THE M&A
JOURNAL 7 (“Generally, where the parties settle on a stock deal, the NOL carryforwards of
a target “C” corporation will transfer with and be available to the target corporation.
Accordingly, a target corporation’s NOL carryforwards that exist as of the closing date
represent an economic asset of the target – the possible reduction of future income taxes.
Thus, these NOLs may be of some value to some buyers, even in this dismal market.
However, our experience has shown that when deal makers are negotiating the purchase
price for a target’s stock they will often either fail to address the potential value of these
NOLs or at least fail to address the value early enough in the process to make a meaningful
difference. In addition, if the issue does arise in price negotiations, buyers often argue that
the market price for NOLs is “pennies on the dollar.”). See also Larry Maples, Pitfalls in
Preserving Net Operating Losses, CPA JOURNAL (March 2007) (“The “value” of a net
operating loss (NOL) depends not only upon its size, but also on the amount of income the
law allows the NOL to offset.”).
188
See Bottomlee, supra note 187.
189
FIN. STANDARDS ACCT. BOARD, Acct. Standards Codification 740, Income Taxes.
190
See also Anthony Catanach and Shelley Wells-Catanach, Net Operating Losses:
How Much Are These "Assets" Really Worth?, 21 COMMERCIAL LENDING REV. 4 (July
2006) (stating “FAS-109 allows these potential tax savings to be recorded on the
company's balance sheet as a deferred tax asset, given that positive future cash flows are
expected from the tax savings generated by the NOL's use.”).
185
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For businesses that are going concerns with reasonable expectations of
future profits, tax attributes no doubt have value. For businesses that can
create tax structures that sell, exchange, or leverage them, they also have
value.191 There are, of course, limitations to NOL usage, including the
NOL limitation rule related to certain changing ownership.192 While NOLs
and other tax attributes are assets, they are assets with no inherent payment
value until they are utilized to offset tax liability. Section 172(b)(1)(A)
allows NOLs to be carried back to offset tax liability for two years and
carried forward to offset future tax liability for 20 years.193 This long time
horizon for potential benefit recognition is a key argument against allowing
NOLs to constitute proceeds in the year the NOL reduction occurs. There
are many extenuating circumstances that would preclude a business from
recognizing the benefit of the NOL such as change in business form,
subsequent years of NOLs, or winding up a business.
Even though tax attributes are valuable to businesses in many cases,
they do not rise to the level of a proceed until they are utilized to offset tax
owed. They do not represent any “end” in the tax process. They are not
equivalent to tax owed. They are a part of the calculation that leads to tax
liability.194 It is the adjustment of tax liability that should be the starting
definition for what is a proceed.
A tax liability can be compromised by the Service or not paid at all for
innumerable reasons.195 This reality forms the basis of the need for the
proceeds to be collected. For tax purposes, collection is the fundamental
purpose of the Service.196 The agency exists to collect revenue. It does not
191

See Robert Rizzi, New Respect for “Trafficking” in Losses, NOL Protections Take
Hold., 37-3 CORPORATE TAXATION 30 (“The result was the development of a cottage
industry of tax planning to maneuver taxpayers safely around the hair trigger, and to permit
the use of NOLs under many conditions that might, in substance, actually involve
trafficking in NOLs.”).
192
See generally § 382.
193
§ 172(b)(1)(A). This time frame has been periodically modified. A temporary tax
provision allowed carryback for five years for 2008 and 2009 NOLs see § 172(b)(1)(H).
194
See Preamble to Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 21, 2012) (“tax attributes
such as NOLs are component elements of a taxpayer’s liability.”).
195
See e.g. Authority for Offers in Compromise (OIC) is found at § 7122, and an OIC
is executed via Forms 656, 733-A and 733-B. Authority for Appeals Office settlement is
found at Reg. § 601.106, and Appeals Settlements are executed on Forms 870, 870-AD or
890. Authority to Closing Agreements is found at § 7121, and closing agreements can be
executed on Forms 866 and 906.
196
See SALTZMAN, supra note 107 at 1-5 (“its distinct objective of revenue
collection”).
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collect tax attributes or more specifically, NOLs. The existence of a tax
attribute does not have a direct revenue impact to the Treasury. The Service
collects money or seizes assets that it liquidates into money, and it has
broad powers of collection.197 The Service has never seized an NOL, nor
could it. The Service would never seize an NOL because an NOL has no
independent value to the Service. To collect means to “claim as due and
receive payment for.”198 Payment is axiomatic to this inquiry.
While a whistleblower tip that serves to reduce a current NOL does not
rise to the level of collected proceeds, that does not mean, however, the
NOLs reduction cannot or will not be liquidated and collected at a future
point. In the preamble to the Final Regulation, the Service explained that if
a whistleblower tip resulted in a reduced NOL, which had previously been
used in full to generate a refund, “then the amount of the erroneous refund
recovered and collected would be collected proceeds.”199 The timing of the
collection of tax proceeds is at issue. Proceeds that are not currently
collected are not entertained under the statute. The Service would have to
deem it collected in guidance. Such guidance, however, is contrary to the
legislative intent requiring the collection of revenues. The use of the term
collected implies that funds must be in hand, and that the proceeds must
have been liquidated and accepted by the Service. For the Service to deem
a proceed collected without having it in hand also presents another problem
for § 7623(a), which states that a whistleblower award “shall be paid from
the proceeds of amounts collected.”200 Without any collection, there are no
proceeds from which to pay under subsection (a).
The original drafter of the whistleblower amendments, Senator
Grassley, commented that he would like to see a more inclusive definition
of collected proceeds.201 While Senator Grassley might want to reward
whistleblowers for information that leads to a reduction in an NOL, he has
expressly recognized that the statutory language makes this impossible.202
In a September 13, 2011 letter to IRS Commissioner Shulman, Senator
197

Id. at 15-3 (“the organization and operation of the collection function, as well as the
substantive law of liens and levies, give the Service broad and formidable powers to collect
delinquent taxes.”).
198
MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/collect?show=1&t=1325105771 (defining collect).
199
See Preamble to Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb, 21, 2012).
200
§ 7623(a). Section 7623(b) differs slightly in that it states that a whistleblower “
shall . . . receive an award . . . of the collected proceeds . . . resulting from the action . . ..”
201
See Grassley letter, supra note 21, at 7.
202
Id.
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Grassley stated that
“[i]t is important for whistleblower confidence - and tax administration that whistleblowers be rewarded for providing information about
income being reduced by net operating losses (NOLs). I understand that
this is a difficult issue as IRS does not collect payments of tax in such
cases and so a whistleblower award likely could not be made until a
taxpayer's NOLs are fully utilized and pays taxes.”203
At its heart, Senator Grassley’s statement recognizes that whistleblower
payments based on the reduction of a tax attribute are not possible until
proceeds are collected. Senator Grassley’s acknowledgement is important
because he has long endorsed expanding and increasing the utilization of
the Whistleblower Program.
A compromise offered by some whistleblower advocates is to calculate
a present value for the tax attribute.204 Whistleblower advocates have
argued the appropriate treatment of a tax attribute reduction, specifically an
NOL, is to pay a whistleblower a percentage of a present value
calculation.205 While administratively tidy and efficient, this calculation
would remove the requirement of “collected” from the whistleblower
statute. It presumes future collection, which may not occur, and it also does
not solve the problem of fulfilling the § 7623 requirements that
whistleblower awards be paid from proceeds. Based on the definition of
proceed206 and the value given to a tax attribute within the Code,207 tax
attributes fail to provide collection as required under statute to pay a
whistleblower award.
C. Overpayment Credit Balances
The 2012 Final Regulation states that collected proceeds include “a
reduction of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax liability
incurred because of the information provided.”208 PMTA 2010-62 verified
the Service’s position that the reduction of “an overpayment credit balance”
203

Id.
See Sullivan and Rubin Letter, supra note 165 at 6-8 (suggesting use of present
value calculations and discount factors in valuing whistleblower payments for proceeds not
yet collected).
205
Id.
206
See supra text accompanying note 177.
207
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(a)(2) (as amended Feb. 22, 2012).
208
Id.
204
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is included in collected proceeds,209 despite conflicting guidance in the
current I.R.M.210
Whistleblower attorneys have suggested that the term “credit balance” is
a poor choice of terminology because it is not a term used with respect to
corporate taxpayers.211 This is correct. Credit balance is rarely found
outside of the retirement account tax context212 or I.R.M. references to
procedures for dealing with taxpayer accounts.213 This poor word choice
has required the Service to further explain its interpretation of overpayment
credit balance.
Although “credit balance” is an imprecise term, the inclusion of
“overpayment” as the modifier offers significant clarity in interpreting the
Service’s intentions. There are many reasons that a taxpayer, individual or
business, might have a credit balance with the Service, including
overpayments, outstanding refundable or nonrefundable credits, or even
certain tax attributes.214 The use of the term overpayment, however,
presumes to exclude all positive tax account balances that are the result of
209

See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128 (analyzing the payment of refund protection
and credit reduction claims under § 7623).
210
I.R.M. 25.2.2.12(1) (Jun. 18 2010 version) (“’satisfaction of taxpayers’ liabilities by
reducing a credit balance is not within the scope of collected proceeds.”).
211
See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 4 (“ . . . the Proposed Regulations are
simply too narrowly drafted to with respect to the impact of credits on complex corporate
returns.”). See also Letter from Linda Stengle, Kenney & McCafferty, PC, to Richard
Hurst, Internal Revenue Service at 1 (Feb. 23, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY, Doc
2011-4349.
212
See e.g. I.R.M. 4.72.14.3, Technical Requirements (05-04-2001).
213
See e.g. I.R.M. 1.2.50.3 Delegation Order 13-2 (Rev. 1) (03-03-2008), I.R.M.
1.13.8.9 Browse Mode (See Exhibit 1.13.8-13 and Exhibit 1.13.8-15) (01-01-2006), I.R.M.
1.13.9.5 Specific instructions for Section 594 returns (04-04-1998), I.R.M. 1.15.29.1
Description and Authorities (07-01-2005), I.R.M. 2.3.29.5 Command Code ICOMP (0623-2009), I.R.M. 2.3.51.12 Table of Screen Exhibits (01-01-2011), I.R.M. 2.4.26.4
Command Code FRM14 (03-30-2009), I.R.M. 2.4.26.3 Command Code FRM49 (03-302009), I.R.M. 2.4.34.3 Terminal Responses for Command Code DOALL (07-01-2011),
I.R.M. 2.4.34.2 Terminal Input For Command Code DOALL (01-01-2011), I.R.M.
3.13.5.57 Glossary of Terms (01-01-2011), I.R.M. 3.13.12.1 Overview (01-01-2011),
I.R.M. 3.13.12.22 EO Delinquency Notices (01-01-2011), I.R.M. 3.17.30.17 Special NonMaster File (NMF) Procedures (01-01-2010), I.R.M. 3.17.30.5 Control Record List (01-012010), I.R.M. 3.17.63.13 Account Series 4000 Liability Accounts (10-01-2004), I.R.M.
3.17.63.26 Federal Tax Deposits (FTD) (07-27-2010), I.R.M. 3.17.64.16 Electronic
Transmissions (09-01-2011), I.R.M. 3.17.64.9 CADE - Customer Account Data Engine
(09-01-2011).
214
See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 4 (stating “An ‘overpayment’ credit
balance is just one of the many types of credit balances that exist under the IRC.”).
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tax credits or losses. Proper interpretation requires giving meaning to all
terms.215
Overpayment credit balance only allows refund of taxpayer’s balances
that are a result of payments, as opposed to nonrefundable credits or tax
attributes such as an NOL, capital loss carryforward, or a foreign tax credit.
If a credit balance resulted from refundable credits and the taxpayer were
refund eligible, then presumably the refund provisions of the Regulation
would apply to allow a whistleblower tip that prevented a refund or enable
the recapture of a refund would apply. As such, use of “overpayment credit
balance” in combination with the refund protection provision disallows
whistleblower payments only on nonrefundable credits or tax attributes,
which are items that are not automatically collected upon occurrence.
The Service most recently clarified overpayment credit balance in the
preamble to the Final Regulation.216 Specifically, the Service stated that use
of overpayment credit balance includes credits to an individual or corporate
taxpayer that could be refunded under § 6402, but does not include amounts
such as § 6603 cash deposits.217 Because § 6402 authorizes the Service to
refund overpayments to taxpayers,218 it follows that the Service would
consider reductions of refund-eligible § 6402 overpayments to be reductions
of overpayment credit balances.
The Service’s notation of § 6603 is more difficult to interpret. Section
6603 allows taxpayers to make monetary deposits with the Service for taxes
not yet due.219 Perhaps the Service’s attempt to distinguish cash deposits
from overpayment credit balances is driven by the Service’s focus on
“overpayment.” By definition, a cash deposit “may be used . . . to pay any
215

See Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“It is the duty of the Court to
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any
construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language
it employed.”).
216
Preamble to Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 22, 2012).
217
Id.
218
§ 6402(a) (“In the case of any overpayment, the Secretary, within the applicable
period of limitations, may credit the amount of such overpayment, including any interest
allowed thereon, against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax on the part of the
person who made the overpayment and shall, subject to subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) [1]
refund any balance to such person.”).
219
§ 6603(a) (“A taxpayer may make a cash deposit with the Secretary which may be
used by the Secretary to pay any tax imposed under subtitle A or B or chapter 41, 42, 43, or
44 which has not been assessed at the time of the deposit. . . .”).
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tax imposed . . . which has not been assessed at the time of deposit.”220 A
cash deposit cannot be an “overpayment” because there was not yet a tax to
pay. The Service’s notation of § 6603 appears to be an attempt to insist on
overpayment as a necessary requisite for funds to be an overpayment credit
balance.
The danger from the preamble’s treatment of § 6603 cash deposits is
that Whistleblowers may infer that cash deposits do not qualify as collected
proceeds. If a cash deposit is used to “satisfy a tax liability incurred
because of information provided,”221 then the cash deposit should be
collected proceeds. A reduction of a cash deposit due to a Whistleblower’s
tip satisfies the elements of collected proceeds. Moreover, the treatment of
the reduction of a cash deposit should be no different than the treatment of
the denial of a refund claim that would have otherwise been paid.222
Utilization of cash deposits to satisfy increased tax liability due to a
Whistleblower’s tip should be collected proceeds. Accordingly, the
Service’s use of § 6603 to delineate overpayment credit balances will likely
create more confusion rather than providing clarity. While the Service
attempted to provide additional guidance for overpayment credit balances in
the Regulation’s preamble, significant uncertainty still surrounds the
inclusion of overpayment credit balances in collected proceeds.
D. Criminal Fines
Other than the inclusion of tax attributes, the other proposals that
received the most attention during the notice and comment period was the
proposed inclusion of all criminal fines and restitution in collected
proceeds.223 The Service has confirmed restitution’s inclusion in collected
proceeds; 224 however, the Service’s exclusion of certain criminal fines from

220

Id.
Treas. Reg § 301.7623-1(a)(2).
222
See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128.
223
See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 6-8 (Apr. 18, 2011); Letter from
Thomas Dunne, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Service at 1-2 (Feb. 22, 2011),
available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-3714; Letter from Thomas C. Pliske, Tax
Whistleblower Law Firm LLC, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Service at 15-17 (Mar.
24, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-6549; Letter from Patrick Carmody,
Carrig Counsel, to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Service at 2 (Mar. 28, 2011), available
at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-6550; Strawn, Lawrence, Kelton and Scott Letter, supra
note 182 at 6-7.
224
Preamble to Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1 (as amended Feb. 22, 2012).
221
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collected proceeds is a change from prior Service policy.225 The Service’s
current policy is that criminal fines that are required to be deposited in the
Crime Victims Fund under 42 U.S.C. § 10601 are not proceeds.226 The
Service’s position implies that it believes the term collected in § 7623
means collected by the Service.227 Fines that are deposited in the Crime
Victims Fund are in fact collected; they are just not collected by the
Service.
A converse interpretation from the Service would create a statutory
conflict in the availability of fund payouts. If criminal fines are proceeds
under § 7623 and collected means collected by the federal government (not
only the Service), then this conflict would result in competing statutory
guidance as to the proper availability of the fines for payments. 42 U.S.C. §
10601 requires that the fines are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and
available to programs under that section, and § 7623 requires making the
fines available for whistleblower payments. Some whistleblower advocates
have suggested that, under statutory construction rules, the 2006
amendments to § 7623 would prevail because they are more recent.228 This
interpretation, however, assumes that criminal fines are proceeds under the
statute, which may not be the case, and ignores a reading that does not
create a conflict between the statutes. The 2006 amendments added
subsection § 7623(b), which includes a parenthetical after collected
proceeds.229 The parenthetical states, “(including penalties, interest,
additions to tax, and additional amounts)”.230 The term “fine” is not
present in the parenthetical, despite the fact that this language had been
included in previous IRS guidance.231 This suggests that the omission of
225

See supra text accompanying notes 81-152 (discussing the Service’s policy
regarding criminal fines). See also supra text accompanying notes 127-135 (noting change
in Service’s policy on the inclusion of all criminal fines in collected proceeds).
226
Id.
227
See PTMA 2010-60, supra note 128 (discussing IRS position that criminal fines
required to be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund are not collected proceeds).
228
Id. (“Although it is true, as you point out, that the 1996 amendments to § 7623
providing award payments will be made from collected proceeds was enacted after the
VOC Act, we do not think, as you suggest, that § 7623 can be interpreted to constitute an
implied exception to the VOC Act.”).
229
§ 7623(b)(1).
230
Id.
231
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.10(1), Factors for Determining the Allowability of Claims (Apr.
27, 1999) (“Rewards are paid only with respect to taxes, penalties and fines collected, and
on amounts of revenues protected (claims or refund denied).”) (emphasis added). See also
I.R.M. 25.2.2.13(1)(a), Partial Allowances, (Apr. 27, 1999) (“However, a partial reward
may be paid if, for example, it can be ascertained in a criminal prosecution case that the
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the term “fine” is intentional because prior versions of the I.R.M. included
fine as a basis for whistleblower payments.232
In administering the tax system, the Service uses penalties and interest
as common terms and for taxpayers who pay late or fail to pay at all.233
Whistleblower advocates have suggested that penalties should include
criminal penalties.234 It could, but a rule of statutory construction is to first
attempt to construe two potentially conflicting statutes so as to give them
both meaning.235 This is possible only if criminal fines are not included in
collected proceeds. If collected proceeds do not include criminal fines, then
there is no conflict between the statutes.
On the other hand, if criminal fines are part of collected proceeds,
another administratively expedient reading, and one taken by the Service in
PTMA 2010-60236 and verbally in the May 2011 hearing,237 would be to
conviction was directly or indirectly attributable to the informant’s information. A reward
allowance based on the fine when paid may be made as a partial allowance prior to the civil
settlement of the tax liability.”) (emphasis added).
232
Id.
233
See e.g. § 6601 et seq. (extensively using the term interest and detailing interest on
tax liabilities and payments to the Service). See also e.g. § 6651 et seq. (using the term
penalty as well as the phrase “addition to tax” to detail taxpayer penalties for failure to pay
a tax, accuracy-related tax issues, and fraud).
234
See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 1-3 (Apr. 18, 2011); Dunne Letter,
supra note 216 at 1-2; Pliske Letter, supra note 223 at 15-17; Carmody Letter, supra note
223 at 2.
235
See 73 AM JUR 2D STATUTES § 168 (2011) (“Ordinarily, related statutes should be
construed, if possible, by reasonable interpretation, so as to give full force and effect to
each of them, since, where it is possible to do so, it is the duty of the courts in the
construction of statutes to harmonize and reconcile laws and to adopt that construction of a
statutory provision which harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory provisions.”).
236
See PTMA 2010-60, supra note 128.
237
See Hearing Transcript, supra note 22 at 14 (statements of Thomas Kane, Office of
Associate Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv., stating “I think there is also a
misconception out there about where we stand on criminal fines. I think the only thing that
we have said so far with respect to criminal fines is with respect to a very narrow
circumstance where criminal fines are deposited into and segregated into a fund
specifically identified under Title XVIII or another title of the code. And because of the
nature of that fund, we the Service can't get at it. I think that's the only thing that we talked
about to date that's really specifically addressed that --.”). See also id. (statements of
Stephen A. Whitlock, Director, Whistleblower Office, Internal Revenue Serv., stating
“Subsequent to the publication of the proposed rule, Chief Counsel released their opinion
on the criminal fine issue and any fine that's required to be deposited into the Victims of
Crime Fund would be outside the scope of our definition of proceeds from which we pay
an award. My understanding is that's pretty much any criminal fine.”). See also id.
(statements of Kristen Witter, Office of Associate Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Serv.,
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exclude only criminal fines that are deposited in the Crime Victim Fund
under 42 U.S.C. § 10601. This is not as clean of a statutory construction as
the alternative explained above but still defensible by the Service.
Of course, it would be ideal if Congress added § 7623 as another
express exception to 42 U.S.C. § 10601, but that is not a currently available
option. The Service is saddled with using statutory construction because it
is tasked with administering and enforcing § 7623, which could conflict
with 42 U.S.C. § 10601. The Service cannot amend either statute, only
Congress may do so.238 As such, the Service must offer guidance that
attempts to harmonize both statutes. The Service does not have the choice to
ignore either one. Its current attempt at harmonizing the statutes is not
unreasonable and the result is that certain criminal fines are not be included
in collected proceeds.
E. Finality Issues
Whistleblower advocates have also expressed concern regarding when
award payments are made.239 This concern is well founded, as the GAO’s
Whistleblower Office audit concluded that “whistleblower claims can take
years to process.”240 Indeed, one whistleblower attorney quotes a time
period of “at least 5-6 years”241 from submission to payment. Such lengths
of time create a disincentive for whistleblowers to step forward, by
temporally separating the risk they undertake and expected reward.
The Service has lengthened the time period for whistleblower payment
to achieve greater finality in the process.242 The Service policy for
stating “The Crime Victims Fund Act specifies that all criminal fines assessed by a district
court are required to be deposited into this fund fines assessed for Title XXVI criminal
violations are not excluded from that requirement, and we do not have access to those
funds to be able to pay out awards.”).
238
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.”).
239
See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 8-10. See also Sullivan and Rubin
Letter, supra note 165 at 6-8. See also Patrick Carmody, Why do Whistleblower Cases
Take
so
Long?,
blog
post,
available
at
http://www.carrigcounsel.com/Carrig_Counsel_Tax_Whistleblower_IRS_Rewards/Alerts/
Entries/2011/7/15_Why_Do_Tax_Whistleblower_Cases_Take_So_Long.html (Jul. 15,
2011).
240
See GAO Report, supra note 76 at 8.
241
See Carmody Blog Post, supra note 239.
242
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010).
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whistleblower payment243 now requires that “the statutory period for [the
taxpayer] filing a claim for refund expires,”244 which is generally two years
from payment of the tax,245 or that “there is an agreement between the
taxpayer and the Service that there has been a final determination of tax for
a specific period and a waiver of the right for filing a claim for refund is
effective.”246
In a typical tax matter, the Service has a limited time to assert a
taxpayer’s deficiency.247 For taxpayers who file a return timely, the Service
must assert a deficiency within three years.248 Taxpayers who understate
gross income by more than 25% are subject to a six-year statute of
limitations,249 and taxpayers who fail to file a return or file a fraudulent
return have no statute of limitations for that tax year.250
Taxpayers are similarly limited in their abilities to apply for a refund.
Section 6511 limits claims for refunds to the lesser of three years from the
time that the return is filed or two years from payment.251 Because
whistleblower payments rely upon collected proceeds, the more relevant
limit is usually two years from payment. Previously, the Service interpreted
collected proceeds to be when payment was collected from the taxpayer.
The Service now adopts the view that “payment will not be paid until there
is a final determination of tax liability,”252 and the Service defines final
determination to include the two-year refund window. 253
This additional two-year wait disappoints some whistleblower
advocates, who view the additional time period as unnecessary.254 The
Service added this time period to achieve finality. Although the old adage
243

See GAO Report, supra note 76 at 8. The eight-step process documented by the
GAO is: 1. Whistleblower files claim, 2. Whistleblower Office initial claim review, 3.
Subject matter expert review, 4. Classification and examination, 5. Appeals and collections,
6. Period for taxpayer to exercise right to request refund. 7. Whistleblower Office final
review and 8. Award payment.
244
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010).
245
§ 6511.
246
Id.
247
§ 6501
248
§ 6501(a).
249
§ 6501(e)(1).
250
§ 6501(c)(1) and (3).
251
§ 6511(a).
252
I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010).
253
Id.
254
See Knott and Lyman Letter, supra note 53 at 8-10; Sullivan and Rubin Letter,
supra note 165 at 11.
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may indicate “that nothing is certain by death and taxes,” finality is actually
quite hard to achieve for the Service, even when it settles with taxpayers.255
Last year, the Service’s Appeals Office closed more than 133,000 taxpayer
matters,256 85-90% of which were likely settled.257 While there are several
ways in which to settle a dispute with the Service, only one way is
statutorily recognized as final: closing agreements under § 7121.258 This
lack of settlement finality has created the need for the Service to wait until
the two-year refund window closes.
The Service settles disputes with taxpayers using settlement agreement
forms (e.g. Forms 870 and 870-AD), closing agreements (e.g. Forms 866
and 906), and compromise agreements (e.g. Offers in Compromise).259 On
its face, settlement agreement Form 870 does not achieve finality. It
contemplates that, post-payment, the taxpayer could request a refund and
the Service could make further assessment.260 The Service prefers to use
this form rather than other forms,261 likely because it allows the Service to
assert later uncovered deficiencies. Indeed, the I.R.M. expressly advises
Service personnel that “[i]f the taxpayer requests greater finality [than Form
870 provides], explain Service policy with regard to reopenings and make
an attempt to persuade the taxpayer a Form 870-type agreement is
adequate.”262
Form 870-AD offers a somewhat more certain resolution in that the
form expressly limits recourse for both the Service and the taxpayer by
stating:
If this offer is accepted, the case will not be reopened by the
commissioner unless there was: fraud, malfeasance, or a
misrepresentation of material fact; a deficiency or
overassessment resulting from adjustments made under
Subchapters C and D of Chapter 63 concerning the tax
255

See infra text accompanying notes 259-269.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2010 Data Book, table 21, available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=207731,00.html .
257
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2009 Data Book, table 21, available at
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=207731,00.html
(comparing
prior
years
information).
258
§ 7121.
259
See SALTZMAN, supra note 107
260
See Internal Revenue Serv., Form 870 (reverse side).
261
See I.R.M. 8.6.4.3.3(1), Agreements Used When Taxpayer Requests Greater
Finality (10-26-2007) (indicating the policy preference for 870 forms).
262
Id.
256
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treatment of partnership and subchapter S items determined
at the partnership and corporate level; an excessive tentative
allowance of a carryback provided by law. No claim for
refund or credit will be filed or prosecuted by the taxpayer
for the years stated on this form, other than for amounts
attributed to carrybacks provided by law.263
Although Form 870-AD expresses finality, there are a number of listed
exceptions that affect finality.264 Moreover, the Supreme Court expressly
found that this form, “though not biding in itself, may when executed
become, under some circumstances, binding on the parties by estoppel.”265
This Supreme Court quote indicates that an 870-AD only achieves finality
in “some circumstances.” Consequently, despite Service efforts to persuade
taxpayers to the contrary,266 common Service settlement agreements (e.g.
Forms 870 and 870-AD) do not achieve finality.
Closing agreements, on the other hand, are statutorily deemed final.
Under § 7121(b) closing agreements “shall be made final and conclusive,
except upon a showing of fraud or malfeasance or misrepresentation of
material fact . . .”267 As deemed final under the statute, “even the parties
themselves may not rescind or cancel”268 a closing agreement in absence of
fraud, malfeasance or misinterpretation. However, even though closing
agreements are statutorily deemed final, collected proceeds may not be fully
realized under a closing agreement that concludes only certain tax matters
and not an entire tax year. For example, Form 906 only contemplates the
settlement of specific tax matters, not setting the tax liability for a tax year
(as contemplated by Form 866). Accordingly, other tax items that are not
settled under Form 906 could affect the ultimate tax liability, which
determines collected proceeds. In other words, a whistleblower could
provide a tip that results in a taxpayer’s increased income (or decreased
deduction); then the taxpayer could resolve the income/deduction matter
under a Form 906 closing agreement but later apply for a refund on the
basis of other tax matters. While the closing agreement concluded the tax
263

See Internal Revenue Serv., Form 870-AD (reverse side) (emphasis added).
Id.
265
See SALTZMAN, supra note 107 at 9-79 (quoting Botany Worsted Mills v. U.S., 278
U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).
266
See I.R.M. 8.6.4.3.3(1), Agreements Used When Taxpayer Requests Greater
Finality (10-26-2007) (stating the Service policy to persuade taxpayers of the adequacy of
870-type forms).
267
§ 7121(b).
268
See SALTZMAN, supra note 107 at 9-98.
264
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matters in question, it did not set the final tax liability for the tax year.
Until a tax year’s tax liability is set and proceeds are collected (based on
that liability), there are no collected proceeds to calculate a whistleblower
award payment.
The lack of certain finality with tax settlements creates significant
uncertainty for the Service and whistleblowers when calculating collected
proceeds. Consequently, finality must be balanced with administrability so
that whistleblower cases can be processed and closed, and an appropriate
incentive level is maintained. The Service’s position with respect to the
two-year refund statute of limitations is administrable and a reasonable time
period to wait to achieve finality for typical matters, matters using
settlement agreements (e.g. Forms 870 and 870-AD), and closing
agreements for specific matters (e.g. Form 906). Closing agreements that
settle a tax year’s liability and waive refund rights (as Form 866 does) are
sufficiently final therefore collected proceeds should not be subjected to the
two-year refund statute when this type of closing agreement is used.
Even with a Form 866 closing agreement for the tax year, the possibility
always exists that subsequent events could alter the collected proceeds at a
later date. For example, subsequent year carrybacks could create this
situation.269 This, however, should not affect the proceeds that are collected
under a Form 866 agreement. Waiting on such a contingency undermines
the certainty, and consequently the incentive, for a whistleblower.
Allowing this level of uncertainty would undermine the legislative intent of
the 2006 amendments to create greater financial incentive for
whistleblowers with tips providing significant revenue. Only Form 866
closing agreements should be considered sufficiently final to measure and
pay collected proceeds once the proceeds are collected from the taxpayer
because this Form settles the tax liability for the taxpayer. All other closing
agreement forms should be subject to the two-year refund statute to
calculate collected proceeds with certainty.
F. Timing Issues
The final issues raised in the comment letters involved timing, both the
timing of income and deductions for the taxpayer and timing of payments to
whistleblowers.

269

See e.g., § 172(b)(1)(A) (allowing for NOL carryback and carryforward).
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1. Temporary Adjustments
Subsequent events are not only a concern with respect to closing
agreements, they are a concern for many other types of whistleblower
claims. The timing of income and deductions has always been a concern
for the Service. Taxpayers have an incentive to defer income recognition
into subsequent years to delay paying tax, and taxpayers have an incentive
to accelerate deductions to minimize current taxable income.270 These
incentives are inherent in the structure of the Code and likely form the basis
for many whistleblower tips. These issues typically do not turn on whether
the income or deduction itself is improper, but instead on the proper timing.
A whistleblower tip that involves a timing adjustment warrants special
consideration.
The anonymous taxpayer’s comment letter raised the issue of whether
“temporary and timing adjustments items that, if adjusted during the exam,
are expected to reverse in a future year” should be considered collected
proceeds.271 The taxpayer argues that proceeds on such amounts “should be
limited to the amount of interest paid by the corporate violator.”272 This
comment is particularly insightful and makes a valid point. For a taxpayer
who inappropriately accelerates a tax benefit but is entitled to claim it at a
later date, a whistleblower tip exposing the deficiency should not be
compensated on the value of the tax year change because it will be claimed
later. Rather, the whistleblower payment should be made on a basis that
reflects the revenue protected. Here, it is the time value of revenue.
Accordingly, as the anonymous taxpayer points out, the whistleblower
should be compensated on the time value of money. This scenario raises
many related questions of timing and finality with respect to collected
proceeds.
2. Timing of Payment & Future Payments
As explained above, some whistleblower attorneys have proposed
monetizing tips, which lead to uncollected proceeds, into current payment
270

See Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934) (“Any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes.”).
271
Letter from Anonymous Taxpayer to Kristen Witter, Internal Revenue Serv., at 3-4
(Mar. 23, 2011), available at TAX NOTES TODAY Doc 2011-6545.
272
Id. at 3.
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using a discount factor.273 These proposals rely on advancing payment for
not yet collected proceeds. Advancing payment is contrary to the statutory
requirement of collection, which contemplates payment in hand.274
Attempts to monetize uncollected proceeds with present value calculations
or discount factors defy the statutory requirement of collection.275 While
this approach is not supported by the language and is unwise, it does
suggest a broader view of temporal measurement that is discussed in Part
IV.276
The outstanding question remaining is when a measurement for an
award must occur. There is no statutory guidance or limit. The current
Service guidance only indicates that it cannot occur before collection and
finality have been met.277 There are no limitations for extending the time
for measurement until collection is made. This also opens up the issue of
periodic payments on collected amounts. These, of course, run contrary to
ease of administration due to the need for continued and perhaps prolonged
monitoring, and timely payment. In certain circumstances, such a plan may
be the only available option for whistleblower compensation.
IV. A BETTER APPROACH FOR COLLECTED PROCEEDS
As discussed in Parts II and III, the Service’s interpretation of collected
proceeds under § 301.7623-1 and the alternatives proposed by the
whistleblower advocates fail to fully address the primary attributes of a
successful Whistleblower Program.278
A successful Whistleblower
Program should offer sufficient incentives to attract whistleblowers,
maintain procedures that are administrable, and promote federal revenue
protection.279 Part IV demonstrates that there is better approach for
collected proceeds that relies on expanding the time frame to capture the
additional tax revenues required for collected proceeds.280
273
See also Sullivan and Rubin Letter, supra note 165 at 7 (advocating use of the
discount factor).
274
See supra text accompanying notes 168-175.
275
See supra text accompanying notes 168-175.
276
See infra text accompanying notes 302-314..
277
See PTMA 2010-62, supra note 128 at 1-2 (stating that the “language . . . has the
legal effect of authorizing the IRS to disburse money that it collects . . .” and further
discussing the interpretation of collected). See also I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview:
Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (noting finality required).
278
See supra text accompanying notes 82-277.
279
See supra notes 5-7.
280
See infra text accompanying notes 302-314.
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The outstanding issues under the current whistleblower program are: (1)
whether proceeds should be paid prior based on future collection,281 (2)
whether all criminal fines should be included in collected proceeds,282 (3)
the inclusion of credit balances and tax attributes in collected proceeds,283
and (4) timing and finality issues related to measuring collected proceeds.284
With respect to future collection, criminal proceeds, credit balances and tax
attributes, the Service has taken a supportable and well-reasoned position.285
However, if the Service would adopt a longer time horizon for the
measurement of collected proceeds and award payment, then much of the
concern over nonpayment for awards resulting in changes to credit balances
and tax attributes could be ameliorated.
A. Whistleblower Awards Cannot be Paid Without Collection
There are numerous proposals that fall under this heading. Proposals
could be as sweeping as rewarding any credible whistleblower claim with a
finders’ fee,286 regardless of collection, or using economic modeling to
predict future proceeds for calculation of award payment.287 Proposals
could also be as narrow as only expanding collected proceeds to include
NOL reductions but no other tax attribute items.288 These alternatives are
appealing because they greatly incentivize whistleblowers to come forward.
While these alternatives are likely to maximize the number of potential
whistleblowers to come forward, the practical administration is lacking
given the Service’s resource constraints. Broadening the scope of collected
proceeds could overly burden the Whistleblower Office, generating too
many claims and diverting attention away from the larger § 7623(b)
whistleblower claims.289 The processing and payment delays under the
current Whistleblower Program are already a significant problem,290 and
these alternatives could exacerbate the current process delays by flooding
the system with claims. More importantly, these alternatives are not
281

See infra text accompanying notes 286-293.
See infra text accompanying notes 294-298.
283
See infra text accompanying notes 299-301.
284
See infra text accompanying notes 302-314.
285
See infra text accompanying notes 286-301.
286
See Sullivan and Rubin Letter, supra note 165 at 4 (suggesting reward of exposure
of all tax fraud).
287
Id. at 7-8 (suggesting the use of a discount factor to arrive at a present value for
future evasion).
288
See supra text accompanying notes 175-207.
289
See Ferziger & Currell, supra note 5 at 1172.
290
See supra text accompanying notes 56-80.
282
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supported by the current statutory language mandating collection,291 and
they utterly fail to protect federal revenue.292 These proposals could
facilitate a tax whistleblower program that pays out more in awards than it
increases tax revenues, which is certainly contrary to the legislative intent
of the 2006 amendments.293 A change in the interpretation of “collected” as
required by statute could increase the incentive to whistleblowers but the
cost of such a change would be too high from an administration and revenue
protection standpoint.
B. Under the Service’s Current Approach, District Court Criminal Fines
are Appropriately Excluded from Collected Proceeds
If Congress decided its objective was to maximize potential tax
whistleblower awards by including fines, 42 U.S.C. § 10601 would provide
an exception to criminal fines in tax whistleblower cases.294 These fines
could be included in collected proceeds and paid to tax whistleblowers, with
the balance going to the criminal victims fund. Given the existence of the
criminal victims fund statute and as discussed in Subpart III.D., the Service
has appropriately interpreted § 7623 to give meaning to both statutes in a
reasonable manner.295
It is evident that the losers here are tax
whistleblowers whose tips are the catalysts for tax criminal prosecutions
resulting in criminal fines.
There is a possible exception to create an award for the Whistleblower.
Prosecuting U.S. attorneys can be cognizant of this statutory landscape and
request restitution in lieu of criminal fines so as to increase the pool of
collected proceeds. It is not a perfect solution. It lacks any degree of
certainty of payment because it relies on sentencing discretion. Worse still,
if the whistleblower’s identity has successfully been kept secret, such a
request could imply to a defendant the existence of a whistleblower.296
Perhaps one saving grace is that tax criminal prosecutions require greater
proof than other tax proceedings297 and are typically reserved for the most
291

See supra text accompanying notes 165-174.
See supra text accompanying notes 194-207.
293
See supra text accompanying notes 165-174.
294
See supra text accompanying notes 223-238.
295
See supra text accompanying notes 228-238.
296
The request itself could imply a whistleblower. In addition, a prosecutor’s request
for a restitution in lieu of criminal fine is likely to engender a request for explanation from
the judge, defense, or both.
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See Tax Court Rule 142(b) (noting the burden of proof for civil tax fraud as “clear
and convincing”). See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (“. . . we explicitly hold that the
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egregious cases. In such cases, proceeds are often had in a variety of forms:
tax revenue, penalties for fraud, and interest.298 In many cases, the other
sources of collection will contribute to a significant pool of proceeds to pay
out the whistleblower.
While a statutory exception would be ideal, the Service cannot just
ignore the existence of 42 U.S.C. § 10601. Given the available options
under the language of statutory language, the Service’s approach to omit
fines from collected proceeds is appropriate.
C. Tax Attributes Cannot be Included in Collected Proceeds
As explained in Subpart III.B., reductions in tax attributes alone cannot
be included in a collected proceeds calculation.299 They must be viewed in
the broader context of tax liability. All award payments require collected
revenues to the Treasury. Tax attributes may provide collected revenues,
however there is no way to calculate with certainty the amount of the
potential revenues that will result from the existence of a tax attribute
item.300 The whistleblower statute is designed to promote federal revenue
protection, and this can only occur if award payments are made from
proceeds that are collected. However, whistleblower information that
results in significant tax attribute reduction may ultimately result in
collected proceeds if the time period for measuring the proceeds is
extended. In the next Subpart, we discuss an expanded time horizon.301
D. The Service should take a Broader View of the Time Period for
Collecting Proceeds
The Service should expand the time horizon for collecting proceeds.
This alternative is a compromise between the Service’s interpretation302 and
whistleblower advocates’ proposals, discussed in Parts II and III.303 This
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.”). See also I.R.M. 25.1.1.2.2, Requirements of Proof (05-29-1999) (noting the
differing burdens for tax criminal matters and tax civil matters).
298
See § 1 (imposing tax on taxable income); § 6601 et seq. (noting interest on tax
liabilities); § 6651 et seq. (noting penalties on tax liabilities).
299
See supra text accompanying notes 175-207.
300
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301
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alternative acknowledges that there must be a positive cash increase in tax
revenues collected in order for a reward payment, but allows additional time
for the positive cash increase to occur. There are two possible methods to
create an additional time frame to calculate collected proceeds. The first is
to allow a whistleblower case that results in an adjustment that produces
uncollected proceeds to remain open until the expiration of any possible
carryforwards. For many items this may be only a few years. For NOLs,
carryforwards are allowed for twenty years.304 In the case of NOLs, this
carryforward period is quite lengthy and is administratively unwieldy. A
variation of the proposal, similar to a proposal advanced by the anonymous
taxpayer,305 could offer any whistleblower claim with a potential for
collected proceeds an additional ten-year window (instead of the full 20year carryforward) for the collection of proceeds.
These alternatives will require additional administration costs because
some cases will not be closed as quickly as under the current interpretation
of collected proceeds, and additional monitoring will be required for all
carryforward cases. To ease the administration of these proposals, the
proposal should only apply to § 7623(b) claims. Payment for claims under
§ 7623(a) are statutorily within the discretion of the Service, and are not the
claims that Congress or the Service are expecting to raise significant
revenue.306 Further, all carryforward claims should be evaluated annually.
The notification to the whistleblower under this proposal is very limited in
nature. The need to provide some communication to the whistleblower
must be weighed against confidentiality concerns.307
Whistleblower claims with carryforwards should be directed into an
annual review cycle for the remainder of the limitations period or the tenyear limit, and the whistleblowers should receive notification that their
claim has been evaluated and directed into the annual review cycle. One
negative of the current program is that, after submission of a tip,
whistleblowers can wait years before receiving any information from the
Service.308 Much of this silence is undertaken to prevent whistleblower
304
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collaboration from tainting the taxpayer case.309 Once taxpayer liability has
been determined and the only outstanding issue is whether proceeds will be
collected in the future, taint is no longer a concern. Communication at this
window is appropriate and will prevent a lack of communication between
the Service and the whistleblower for what could in some cases be decades.
The concern of taint and for disclosure of taxpayer information may still
be present with the proposed notification. If the notification contains any
more information than a statement that the tip is being placed in the annual
review cycle, then the notification may require that whistleblower execute a
confidentiality statement that the information contained in this notice and
the receipt of the notice itself will not be disclosed to any third party with
the exception of the whistleblower’s legal representative. The notification
is not a promise of a future reward but an acknowledgement that the
submitted claim may be eligible for payment based on the investigation and
potential future use of the information reported to generate collected
proceeds.
The time expansion proposal does not violate any statutory prohibition.
In fact, there is not mention of time for measurement of proceeds. Only the
I.R.M. discussed the need for finality with respect to the taxpayer’s case.310
There is no discussion of time allowed for collection of proceeds.
Accordingly, no current guidance would have to be changed. This proposal
will merely speak in an area on which the Service has been silent.
Admittedly, this proposal does add administrative cost and could
prolong the process in some ways; however, some of the additional
administration should be accomplished by computer algorithm to check for
the collection of additional proceeds that could be eligible for distribution to
a whistleblower. A review by Whistleblower Office personnel will be
required if proceeds are flagged; however, appropriate computer-based
screening, at which the Service has proven previously adept, should limit
additional labor costs.

(“The process, from submission of complete information to the Service until the proceeds
are collected, may take several years.”).
309
See I.R.M. Exhibit 25.2.2-6, Memorandum from Steven T. Miller (Feb. 17, 2010)
(“In some cases, contacts between the IRS and an informant may taint information received
from the informant.”).
310
See I.R.M. 25.2.2.1(6), Overview: Authority and Policy (06-18-2010) (“payment
will not be paid until there is a final determination of tax liability”).
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Most importantly, the proposal functions to fulfill the legislative intent
for a greater incentive.311 Senator Grassley has expressed concern that
whistleblowers who have come forward with good and valuable tips are not
paid because the tips may result in tax attribute changes that are not readily
converted into collected proceeds.312 This proposal takes a broader view of
the time for collection to allow for the payments when proceeds are
collected. It does so, however, without resorting the frequently advanced
proposal of payout without collection.313 Such proposals do not protect
federal revenue and could facilitate a program that spends far more on
whistleblowers than it takes in.
This proposal certainly contemplates that the Service would make partial or
periodic payments as proceeds are collected. This should not be unusual. It
was contemplated in the 1999 I.R.M., which provided that the
whistleblower “Claims Examiner should periodically review the account to
determine whether additional collections have been made which would
justify an additional reward to the informant.”314 The proposal to increase
the length of the time to calculate the collected proceeds will continue to
protect federal revenues, create a greater incentive to whistleblowers and
create reasonable additional administration requirements. This proposal
provides a workable solution to the collected proceeds that is currently
lacking in the Service’s interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The Service’s whistleblower program has undergone significant revision
in the last six years.315 These revisions have drastically improved the
incentives to attract whistleblowers and the Service’s administration of the
program, while continuing to promote federal revenue protection. Despite
these improvements, additional work is needed to address several
deficiencies. The deficiency in greatest need of correction is what
constitutes collected proceeds under the whistleblower statute.316 Under
current guidance, the term “collected proceeds” remains vague and
311

Compare §7623(a) and (b) (no minimum case threshold for discretionary payment
vs. mandatory payment for tips involving amounts in dispute of at least $2 million or
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ambiguous despite the Service’s attempts at clarification. Additional
guidance is necessary to promote greater certainty for award payments.
This certainty is critical to attracting potential whistleblowers to come
forward, and, if appropriately structured and administered, should decrease
award payout delays.
As discussed in Part IV, the collected proceeds term should be
clarified.317 The changes to the Regulation are a step in the right
direction,318 but stop far short of offering a comprehensive reading of
collected proceeds. The alternatives proposed by the whistleblower
advocates have the opposite problem of being overly inclusive.319 Our
proposed solution attempts to find a reasonable middle-ground that provides
sufficient incentive to attract whistleblowers to come forward while
maintaining administrability and federal revenue protection. This solution
upholds the Service current (non-conflicting) guidance on collected
proceeds but expands the timeframe for payout of tax attribute items
including net operating losses.
For any valid whistleblower tip that results in a tax attribute adjustment
but not collected proceeds, the proposed solution extends the time for
collecting proceeds to either the full window for taxpayer usage of the tax
attribute, or, in the alternative, a ten-year window for easier administrative
purposes. Opening a ten-year window for claims that do not generate
additional tax revenues in the return year solves an inherent problem to the
current definition of collected proceeds that focuses exclusively on the tax
return year or years reported by the whistleblower and ignores the potential
value of tax attributes. This ten-year window further acknowledges that
many whistleblower claims may involve tax revenue recoveries that extend
beyond the tax year or years reported by the whistleblower.
In order for this proposal to succeed the Service must be willing to use
partial payouts of awards and implement additional resources into
monitoring and tracking claims throughout the entire ten-year payout
window. While there are some additional costs to the Whistleblower Office
under the proposal, the added certainty and potential for award payouts not
present under the current system should maintain the level of tips already
attracted and perhaps attract new whistleblower tips. This new system
317
318
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would appeal to whistleblowers who have a valid tip but are concerned that
there is no current basis for a payout of an award. By submitting their claim
now, the whistleblower is essentially setting a lien on future tax revenues
that result from the information turned into the Whistleblower Program and
no longer has to weigh the risk of having another whistleblower come
forward with the same information or potentially have the taxpayer amend
and correct the erroneous return independently from the IRS.
Implementing an interpretation of collected proceeds that enables
whistleblowers to predict potential award payouts with greater certainty
provides greater incentive to the whistleblower to come forward. An
effective incentive for whistleblowers is the crux to an effective
Whistleblower Program. The definition of collected proceeds must be
reevaluated and expanded to ensure that a proper incentive is offered to
attract whistleblowers to step forward and blow the whistle.

